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BEYOND BABEL: ACHIEVING THE PROMISE OF 
OUR AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
ANDRÉ LEDUC 
ABSTRACT 
This Article completes a therapeutic treatment of the originalism debate. The 
long-running debate over constitutional originalism is pathological, more confused 
than insightful or important. This Article completes the course of therapy by 
sketching the constitutional discourse and practice we may hope for after the debate 
over originalism is transcended and left behind. In so doing, it disarms the final 
defense of the participants in that debate in that they have no alternative. Only by 
sketching what that alternative is can its existence be proved, and the ideopolises of 
the protagonists finally be reconstructed. This Article shows the constitutional theory 
and criticism we may aspire to if we are freed of the bonds of the debate over 
originalism and its underlying assumptions. 
First, the Article outlines what a post-debate constitutional decision process 
would look like if the judicial decision makers no longer felt compelled to articulate 
their opinions in the vocabulary of that debate. Second, it describes what 
constitutional scholarship could look like without the constraints of the 
Weltanschauung shared by the protagonists in the originalism debate. Third, the 
Article gives currency to the claim that abandoning the debate about originalism can 
revive the public discourse about our Constitution, what it says, what it does not say, 
and what it should say. Fourth, and finally, the Article suggest how abandoning the 
perspective of the debate about constitutional originalism frees even the principal 
protagonists in that debate to engage with the American Constitution—and with 
those who would apply the Constitution very differently—in a more direct and 
powerful way. The framework of the originalism debate constrains and distorts the 
argument and discourse rather than enriches it. At all of these levels, leaving the 
debate over constitutional originalism behind gives us a revived constitutional 
discourse and a more robust American Constitution. 
CONTENTS 
I.  BEYOND THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE ...................................................... 186 
 A.  Foundations for a Post-Originalism Debate Constitutional  
  Practice ......................................................................................... 193 
 B.  Thinking about Constitutional Cases: Reimagining Practice ....... 197 
 C.  New Directions in the Academy .................................................... 220 
  1.  Richard Posner and the National Security  
  Constitution........................................................................... 224 
  2.  Charles Fried, Doctrine, and Judgment ................................. 228 
  3.  Conclusion ............................................................................ 235 
                                                           
 © André LeDuc 2016. I am grateful to Stewart Schoder and Laura Litten for thoughtful 
comments on an earlier draft, and to Dennis Patterson, Charlotte Crane, and Kristin Hickman 
for comments on some closely related material. Errors that remain are the author’s own 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
186 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:185 
 
 D.  The Public Sphere after the End of the Originalism  
 Debate ........................................................................................... 236 
 E.  Reimagining the Contributions of the Principal Protagonists ...... 241 
 II.  OUR AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ............................................................. 245 
 
I. BEYOND THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE 
Can we ever hope to leave the unhappy originalism debate behind? It has been 
taken as a given of our constitutional landscape for nearly a half century. Yet, yes, 
we can. Indeed, we must. We can because the debate is grounded on implausible 
tacit philosophical premises. It is more a creature of confusion than a matter of 
significant, substantive disagreement.1 We must if we are to grapple forthrightly with 
the constitutional questions that matter. We need robust discussion over the 
substantive constitutional choices facing the Republic rather than an academic 
debate that seeks to delegitimize certain types of argument based upon flawed 
ontological premises.2 But to move beyond the debate over originalism requires that 
we have a compelling alternative to the siren call of originalism and the apparent 
alternatives, like the Living Constitution, law as integrity, and judicial minimalism, 
among others, defended by its critics. 
This Article sketches what that alternative future looks like, not as a matter of 
theory3 but as a matter of practice.4 By practice I mean simply the accepted 
constitutional argument, decision, and commentary as undertaken and accepted by 
the judges empowered to decide constitutional cases, the advocates who appear 
before them, and the individuals participating in the commentary about those 
arguments and decisions as a matter of law.   
                                                           
 1 See André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of 
the Debate over Originalism, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 131, 189-202 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, 
Anti-Foundational Challenge]. I am not denying that originalists and their critics disagree 
about substantive constitutional matters, only that their disagreements about originalism and 
its alternatives are important or fruitful. 
 2 By endorsing an important role for constitutional discussion, I do not mean to suggest 
that such public discourse encompasses all issues that must be considered in the public, 
political sphere or to disregard the important limitations on the role of courts as agents of 
change, only to assert the importance of a robust substantive constitutional discourse. See 
generally, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
 3 The theoretical arguments are presented in André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations 
of the Debate over Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 263, 263-67 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, 
Ontological Foundations]; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 1; André LeDuc, 
Striding Out of Babel: The Promise of Our American Constitution, HAMLINE MITCHELL L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel]. 
 4 Aficionados of the philosophical debate about the mind-body problem will recognize 
this strategy as reminiscent of the gambit of the eliminative materialists in the 1960s. See 
generally Richard Rorty, Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories, 19 REV. METAPHYSICS 
24 (1965). Here the strategy is to describe how we might come to stop talking about original 
intentions and understandings—whether to affirm them as privileged in constitutional 
argument—or to reject them as unprivileged in favor of other sources of privileged 
constitutional argument. 
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When Robert Bork proclaims that there is no alternative to originalism, he could 
only be right, not as a matter of necessity, as he sometimes claims,5 but as a 
contingent, historical fact. The Constitution is a matter of historically contingent 
social practice and that practice encompasses arguments beyond those privileged by 
originalism.6 Similarly, originalism’s critics have not offered an account that joins 
the demands of a relatively accessible and transparent theory of constitutional 
interpretation and adjudication with a plausible account of our constitutional doctrine 
and have generally failed to recognize the legitimate place of originalist arguments.7 
If Brown v. Board of Education8 and Loving v. Virginia9 are the cliffs over which 
originalism may be pushed by its critics,10 then the specter of lawless judges acting 
with unfettered discretion to advance their political ends has been the cliff over 
which Professors Tribe, Dworkin, and Sunstein and Justices Brennan and Breyer, 
together with most of the rest of originalism’s critics, have been dangled or thrown 
by the originalists.11 The critics are, after all, the doctrinal heirs of the Warren Court 
and they generally do not reject the constitutional decision-making of that Court.12 
                                                           
 5 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 251-59 (1989) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (arguing that the claims of originalism are 
necessarily true). In his earlier statements of originalism Bork admittedly did not make this 
strong modal claim. See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971). For a fuller discussion of this argument and the 
objections to it, see André LeDuc, Originalism’s Implications, section II.D (Sep. 1, 2015) 
[hereinafter LeDuc, Originalism’s Implications] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 6 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA 73 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS] (arguing implicitly that 
there could be a possible world in which originalism would be a sensible theory of 
constitutional decision-making, but that that world is not ours). See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]; 
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) 
(1807) (seminal philosophical account of how our conceptual framework is historical, not 
absolute and unchanging). 
 7 Even Philip Bobbitt, generally so catholic in his approach to permissible forms of 
constitutional argument, appears hard-pressed to explain why historical and textual arguments 
privileged by the originalists ought to be persuasive or authoritative. BOBBITT, FATE, supra 
note 6, at 9 (“At first, one must notice how odd is that the original understanding in any field 
of study should govern present behavior.”). It is possible that Stephen Sachs’s account of 
originalism that attributes originalism’s force to the inertia of law may offer an account of the 
force of historical argument. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 
38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 818-22 (2015). 
 8 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 9 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 10 See GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY 106 (1992) (characterizing Brown as posing an insuperable challenge for originalism). 
 11 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, at 251-59 (defending the claim that the 
apparent alternatives to originalism are indeterminate and therefore fundamentally flawed as 
legal theories). 
 12 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 66-74 (2005) [hereinafter BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY] (endorsing an expansive 
 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
188 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:185 
 
Originalism’s critics have not been aided by their metaphors of the living, unwritten, 
and invisible Constitution13—nor should those metaphors have been persuasive. 
Those metaphors tacitly devalue the importance of the constitutional text, as well as 
the historical expectations, intentions, and understandings at adoption or 
amendment.14 Moreover, those metaphors also devalue and undermine the formality 
of the writtenness of the constitutional text and the weight attributed to this feature 
of the Constitution in our culture. As is so often the case, vocabulary is important in 
this debate, revealing the tacit commitments that make the entire debate both 
possible and ultimately fruitless as well.15 
Despite our constitutional hopes and aspirations, there is no indication that the 
debate over originalism is coming to a resolution16 or even petering out on its own.17 
It continues unabated.18 Some might suggest that Jack Balkin's Living Originalism 
and Scott Soames’s theory of deferentialism19 reflect a post-debate synthesis 
                                                           
right to privacy). Some critics of originalism, like Cass Sunstein, also distance themselves 
from the jurisprudence of the Warren Court. 
 13 See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION  (2008) [hereinafter TRIBE, INVISIBLE]. 
 14 They tacitly devalue the history and text of the Constitution and the arguments from that 
text and history because they substitute a vocabulary of an evolving and fluid Constitution. 
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 141 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] (mocking Tribe's 
terminology of constitutional temporal flux). 
 15 See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and 
Historicism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATISM: CLASSICAL, RECENT, AND CONTEMPORARY 
(2011); see also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INFERENTIALISM 70 (2000) (describing Oscar Wilde's rejection of the term "blasphemy" at trial 
and the importance of vocabulary in carrying tacit substantive propositional commitments). 
 16 See, e.g., Symposium, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 371 (2013); Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 
VA. L. REV. 493, 494-96 (2013) (arguing that originalism cannot justify the decision in Bolling 
v. Sharpe on the basis of an analysis different from those that have been advanced in the 
debate over whether Brown can be reconciled with originalism); Brian A. Lichter & David P. 
Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 NW. L. REV. 491, 491-94 (2009).  
 17 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Limits of Textualism in Interpreting the Confrontation 
Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 737, 741-42 (2014); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond 
Textualism: Why Originalist Theory Must Apply General Principles of Constitutional Law, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 705 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Textualism and District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729 (2014); see also supra authorities cited note 16. 
 18 See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 7; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 07-24), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244; see also supra authorities cited 
notes 16 & 17. 
 19 Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, Deferentialism]. 
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(Soames asserts as much for his constitutional theory)20 along the lines advocated 
here. Such a view might appear supported by Balkin's fusion of a theory of 
originalism with a commitment to unenumerated rights,21 including the right to 
abortion.22 The synthesis (or perhaps, mere conjunction) of an originalist 
methodology with the politically liberal assertion of a constitutional right to abortion 
might suggest that the stakes of the debate over originalism have largely been 
redefined, with the result that the debate itself will in turn collapse.23 Mainstream 
originalists have been cautious in welcoming Balkin into the fold.24 Living 
Originalism does not signal the transcendence of the originalism debate. Balkin 
appears to believe that there is a fact of the matter about original understandings that 
is dispositive as to the resolution of contemporary constitutional questions.25 
Moreover, any such armistice in the debate over originalism based solely upon the 
consequences derived from originalism will likely be fragile and tentative. There can 
be no resolution or transcendence of the debate until the shared ontological premises 
of the debate are discarded, because those premises make the debate possible.26 
What is the payoff if we adopt this strategy? The therapeutic approach entails 
that the description of the alternative, post-debate world is as important an element 
in the project as any of the other steps in the therapy.27 The claim that the originalism 
                                                           
 20 Id. at 597-98 (arguing that only after the meaning of a legal provision has been 
determined ought its intent or purpose become relevant). It is not clear that Soames’s approach 
to constitutional meaning would satisfy the originalists, because he looks beyond semantics in 
determining the meaning of the authoritative constitutional text. Id. at 598 (“As with ordinary 
speech, [what the law asserts or stipulates] is usually not a function of the linguistic meaning 
alone; it is a function of meaning plus the background beliefs and presuppositions of 
participants.”). 
 21 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 208-18. 
 22 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291, 312-13 
(2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion] (arguing that Roe v. Wade may be defended on 
originalist grounds by looking to the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather 
than its originally expected application, and understanding that Roe protects liberty and 
enforces equality as required by that amendment). 
 23 See STRAUSS, supra note 13 (arguing that the original understandings can also be turned 
against conservative interpretations of the Constitution). 
 24 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 665-68 (2009) (expressing caution with respect to 
Balkin’s purported endorsement of originalism on the grounds that Balkin’s concept of 
framework originalism may permit the federal government too much power). 
 25 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 14. 
 26 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 3; LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 1; but see BRIAN LEITER, Why Quine Is Not a 
Postmodernist, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 137, 139 n.6 (2007) (denying the anti-foundationalist 
claim that the controversy over the scope and legitimacy of judicial review is rooted in a 
representational theory of language or an empirical theory of legal propositions). 
 27 I invoke the celebrated metaphor of the constitutional conversation here not in any 
strong descriptive sense but only to take an agnostic position about the best characterization of 
the therapeutic strategy that I am proposing. And, as has been pointed out by Sanford 
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debate is pathological is a claim that the protagonists in the debate are imprisoned by 
in part because they cannot imagine or articulate an alternative.28 Thus, the task is to 
outline what such a world would be so that the protagonists can not only see it is 
preferable, but so that they can see it as possible. The power of the tacit premises and 
assumptions of the originalism debate is such that the very possibility of an 
alternative is not always recognized.29 
The conclusion of the originalism debate offers the promise that we may 
reconnect legal scholarship with the work of the courts30 and perhaps even with 
political discourse within the public sphere of the Republic. That connection to the 
public sphere has long been largely missing.31 While the debate over originalism has 
certainly sounded both in the legal academy and in the public, political, and judicial 
                                                           
Levinson, the legal nature of constitutional law, with its element of coercive force, 
distinguishes such discourse, at least in its authoritative case, from ordinary conversation. 
 28 The apparent need to continue the debate over originalism has various sources. As a 
sociological matter, the number of law professors tenured as a result of their contribution to 
the debate likely adds substantial inertia to the continuing controversy. At a more conceptual 
level, the grip of the tacit ontological commitment to an objective, independent Constitution 
ought not to be underestimated. See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 3. 
 29 The possibility and nature of progress in our normative thinking, whether moral or 
political, and its relation to argument, is thoughtfully explored in Kwame Appiah’s The Honor 
Code. While Appiah does not expressly adopt the therapeutic approach advocated in this 
Article, his approach is generally supportive of the strategy adopted here in its express 
acknowledgment that the instances of moral progress he describes was not a matter of making 
new or stronger arguments, just as I argue that moving beyond the debate about originalism 
will not occur as one side or the other makes new or more compelling arguments within the 
conceptual context of that debate. While his focus is upon a concept of moral revolution and I 
am agnostic on the question whether the strategies I am developing are normal or 
revolutionary, that difference is not central to the commonality of our shared approach. See 
generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN 
(2010). 
 30 The dissociation of constitutional scholarship from the work of the courts and, indeed, 
the irrelevance of that work for some has been widely remarked and a variety of conclusions 
derived therefrom. See generally, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami & Kevin C. Walsh, Judge Posner, 
Judge Wilkinson, and Judicial Critique of Constitutional Theory, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633 
(2014). 
  31 I have in mind, for example, not historical classics like The Federalist Papers, but, for 
example, DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 
(1965) (highlighting the crisis in African American families arising from absent fathers) and 
the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). See also 
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1999). What is striking, I 
believe, is the relative absence of similar works in the past couple decades, except at the 
margins. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cry, the Beloved Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/opinion/cry-the-beloved-constitution.html; 
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2002) 
(articulating a Posnerian account of the decline). Edward Kleinbard’s recent attack on United 
States federal fiscal policy may stand as an important counterexample. See EDWARD D. 
KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 
(2014) (arguing that federal fiscal policy must be assessed in its entirety, without the 
traditional silos for the analysis of taxation and for spending). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/7
2016] BEYOND BABEL 191 
 
spheres,32 the debate by its terms has been dissociated from a discussion of 
constitutional good and the choices we face with respect thereto. The historicism of 
originalism purports to divorce our constitutional practice from the pursuit of the 
constitutional good by the current constitutional actors—judges, legislators, 
presidents, and citizens—except in advocating the procedural commitments of 
originalism. The historicism of originalism purports to divorce our constitutional 
practice from the pursuit of the constitutional good by the current constitutional 
actors—judges, legislators, presidents, and citizens—except in advocating for the 
procedural commitments of originalism. Correspondingly, the efforts by critics of 
originalism to discredit such textual and historical arguments fail to recognize such 
arguments as a central part of our constitutional practice.33  
Without the dominating procedural focus of the originalism debate, we may hope 
to engage with the substantive constitutional doctrinal questions that confront the 
Republic and its citizens. Many recognize that we live in a novel national security 
world34 and many of us share a concern that the discourse of the public sphere with 
respect to the constitutional issues that thereby arise is not developing as the 
Republic needs and deserves.35 Without the distraction of the methodological 
constraints defended by protagonists on both sides of the debate over originalism we 
may hope to make explicit those questions and issues and begin the dialogue that 
may generate solutions.36 We cannot be bound to a methodology that commits us to 
                                                           
 32 Most notably, in claims made by the Reagan Department of Justice and regularly in the 
confirmation process, particularly in confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees. See, 
e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 59 (2009), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm (opening statement of the 
Hon. Sonia Sotomayor) (“[My judicial philosophy is] [S]imple: fidelity to law.”); Edwin 
Meese III, Toward A Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988). 
 33 Stephen Sachs offers perhaps the best account of why such historical arguments have 
the force that they have. He argues that originalism is a theory of change in law, and that 
originalism reflects a commitment to the persistence of law in the absence of a legitimate 
change thereof. See Sachs, supra note 7. 
 34 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2009) (describing the extent to which national security concerns and 
fear of terrorism led to apparently illegal counterterrorism actions and policies); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) 
[hereinafter POSNER, SUICIDE PACT]; JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2006) (defending a broad interpretation of 
the President’s power based upon the War Powers Clause and the concept of the unitary 
executive). 
 35 See, e.g., KLEINBARD, supra note 31 (arguing that the partisan disarray in the federal 
government’s legislative policymaking fails to recognize the extent to which legislative 
paralysis makes de facto choices seemingly inconsistent with our shared national values); see 
generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF 
HISTORY (2002) (exploring the geopolitical implications of the growing inability of the 
traditional nation state to maintain the integrity of its boundaries against threats and protect its 
citizens and predicting the demise of the modern nation state). 
 36 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6; see also DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 129, 
149–50 (1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH] (endorsing Bobbitt’s claim that the debate 
over the legitimacy of judicial review is grounded on a shared philosophical error). 
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find those solutions only in the original understandings or expectations or, 
alternatively, that precludes us from finding them there, or that prohibits us from 
forging them today within our constitutional practice. 
We have the potential to achieve a constitutional law that answers some of our 
questions and, through our constitutional processes, allows us to articulate and 
ultimately impose upon our fellow citizens and residents our shared fundamental 
democratic, republican, and constitutional commitments. We can do all of that 
without either recreating the excesses of the jurisprudence of the Warren Court or 
without appealing to the implausible reductionism of the originalists. In so doing, we 
can capture and preserve the force of our American Constitution.37 
I proceed then to conclude a therapeutic38 path by which to move beyond the 
paralyzing status quo defined by the debate over originalism.39 In doing so, this 
                                                           
 37 I also join those who have lamented the loss of responsibility for upholding the 
Constitution by the non-judicial branches of the state. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing for a popular constitutionalism in 
which the people take a more assertive and important role in constitutional decision-making 
than at present); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (1998). It is less likely that the judiciary has usurped the role as the 
exclusive guardians of the Constitution than that the legislative and, to a perhaps lesser extent, 
the executive branch have abdicated that role. Those important actors must be encouraged to 
reassume their constitutional responsibility to uphold the Constitution, too. It is natural to 
wonder whether this aspiration is no more realistic than, for example, Dean (now Justice) 
Kagan’s expression of hope in 1995 that Supreme Court nominees would engage in a public 
discourse about substantive constitutional issues in their nomination hearings. See Elena 
Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 935-38 (1995) (reviewing 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)). Professor (now Justice) Kagan’s view 
was, and is, unrealistic because the goal of a confirmation hearing, from the President and the 
nominee’s perspective, is to secure confirmation of the nominee; substantive discussion 
cannot advance this goal at the present time, and may easily operate to diminish the 
probability of confirmation. Justice Kagan came to understand this herself, too, as evidenced 
by her own testimony at her Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See generally 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan, to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010). 
The view expressed here will be more realistic only if sophisticated political actors will 
determine that they have an interest in such different behavior. How would such a change 
arise? It is unlikely that even fervent moral exhortation from the legal academy, whether from 
the Left, the Right or both would have much effect. One could imagine enacting general civil 
or criminal sanctions on political actors for violations of the Constitution, but the threshold 
resistance to such enactment would appear very great. Even if enacted, however, the questions 
of standing and other practical issues of enforcement would appear serious. More importantly, 
providing civil or criminal penalties for unconstitutional actions by elected or judicial officials 
would appear to constitute an undesirable expansion of state sanctions, more likely to lead to 
more partisanship than to good faith attention to the requirements of the Constitution. So 
while we might in the abstract prefer a political constitutional culture in which elected and 
unelected government officials took greater responsibility for acting in conformity to the 
Constitution that does not appear easy to achieve. 
 38 The novel strategy needed here is therapeutic because the conflict between originalism 
and its alternatives is pathological. It reflects errors and confusions, not important substantive 
constitutional disagreements that may be resolved merely by argument. Instead, we have to 
recreate the constitutional ideopolises of the participants in the debate, and then adduce 
evidence that may lead them to feel comfortable to move beyond those stances. For a more 
 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/7
2016] BEYOND BABEL 193 
 
Article breaks with the participants in the debate, each of whom is committed either 
to the triumph of originalism or to its rejection. I complete this therapeutic strategy 
with respect to the debate over originalism by showing how an alternative stance can 
permit a revitalized constitutional discourse in the courts, in the academy, and in the 
public sphere.  
A. Foundations for a Post-Originalism Debate Constitutional Practice 
The originalists and their critics do not contemplate a world in which the 
Constitution is a matter of practice, rather than an objective thing that can provide us 
answers. I have argued elsewhere against that assumption and defended a therapeutic 
strategy for the debate over originalism, arguing that there is no constitutional gold 
standard independent of the hurly burly of our constitutional argument and 
decision.40 That constitutional practice is enough to give currency to our 
constitutional claims. The detailed, charitable account of the debate I have elsewhere 
offered ought to have given both sides reason to seek new alternatives behind the 
sterile exchanges that constitute the originalism debate. But the failure of the existing 
debate does not alone show that there is an alternative or what such an alternative 
might be. 
The final therapeutic step is to begin to imagine the world of constitutional 
decision-making and interpretation without the dualisms of the originalism debate. 
There are two elements in that exercise. We must first identify what we would give 
up in abandoning the originalism debate. We must also recognize what we would 
gain. If we abandon the originalism debate, we must concede that the originalist 
strategy of delegitimizing other modes of argument must be abandoned.41 The 
originalists must concede that prudential, structural, doctrinal, and ethical arguments 
are legitimate and legitimating—even if and when uncompelling. Their critics must 
acknowledge the place of historical and textual arguments, because no constitutional 
theory can delegitimize those forms of argument again even if the critics want to 
argue against the conclusions such arguments would yield in particular cases. In the 
place of such wholesale, methodological challenges to various modes of argument, 
we must return to a retail method of constitutional argument. Each constitutional 
                                                           
complete discussion and contextualization of this therapeutic strategy, see LeDuc, Striding 
Out of Babel, supra note 3. 
 39 See André LeDuc, What Were They Thinking? (July 15, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, What Were They Thinking?]; see also 
André LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim (July 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim]; André LeDuc, Political Philosophy and the 
Fruitless Quest for an Archimedean Stance in the Debate over Originalism, 85 UMKC L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Political Philosophy]; André LeDuc, The 
Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: Five Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 
12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional 
Interpretation]. 
 40 See generally LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 3. 
 41 The anti-foundational arguments made here would also foreclose other delegitimization 
strategies that challenge existing kinds of argument that are part of our constitutional practice, 
too. Because historical and textual arguments are accepted modes of constitutional argument, 
the frequent disdain and disregard for those arguments as of little weight is also wrong.  
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question must be addressed on its own.42 That does not mean that we must abandon 
the rules of constitutional law.43 We can both address each case and recognize the 
importance of consistency and general rules by continuing our constitutional 
decision practices. 
An alternative to originalism must satisfy two conditions. David Lewis long ago 
reminded us that when philosophy conflicts with our ordinary ways of speaking and 
thinking, it is usually philosophy that is mistaken.44 That same caution applies at 
least equally to theories of the Constitution. Both the originalists and their critics 
purport to discredit established modes of constitutional argument under their more 
theoretically consistent accounts of the Constitution. The inconsistency of the 
accounts offered by the originalists and most of their critics is powerful evidence that 
our theoretical claims are flawed. Thus, first, an account of our Constitution, our 
constitutional debates, and our constitutional law must give an account that is, at 
least at some level, both accessible to, and compelling for, our citizens.45 Second, it 
must also give a theoretically defensible account of our constitutional history and our 
constitutional law that engages and persuades our constitutional elites, composed of 
the senior members of the federal judiciary and the constitutional commentariat. 
Many of the alternatives to originalism fail to provide a constitutional theory that 
provides the requisite transparency and accessibility. For the ordinary citizen, 
thinking about the Constitution at a commonsensical level, doctrines of “the Living 
Constitution,” “the invisible Constitution,” and “the minimal Constitution,” or the 
myth of Hercules as judge and philosopher, fail the first test. That is, all of these very 
thoughtful and sophisticated theories, championed by able constitutional scholars or 
judges, are difficult to reconcile with either the intuitions or the judgments of the 
citizen on the street, or with her aspirations.46 The ways in which such theories 
                                                           
 42 In asserting that each case must be addressed on its own, I am not asserting that 
considerations of consistency and fit that arise out of precedent and doctrine more generally 
are inapposite. The claim is only that a methodological first strike cannot delegitimize any of 
the accepted modes of constitutional argument that might otherwise be available. 
 43 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rules] (exploring the central role of general rules in modern 
law and associated concepts of justice). 
 44 DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION 1 (1969) (cautioning philosophers tempted to defend 
philosophical theories inconsistent with our ordinary understandings and practices). 
 45 In suggesting that any account of the Constitution and constitutional argument must be 
accessible to the Republic’s citizens, I am not suggesting that there is no place for experts in 
our constitutional practice. Not every citizen need be equally able to appear as an advocate 
before the Supreme Court, for example. But the account of constitutional law and decision-
making must be comprehensible by the citizens and, at least as importantly, that constitutional 
law story must resonate with them. For a good account of these constitutional roles, see 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 59-73. 
 46 Jack Balkin offers one of the most sensitive accounts of the multiple roles of the 
Constitution in his theory of framework originalism. See id. In so doing, he recognizes the 
aspirational role of the Constitution and the evolution of the Constitution over time, as well as 
the importance of that possibility in political and constitutional discourse. The original 
Constitution’s treatment of slavery is only the most obvious and celebrated example of this 
possibility. Although Balkin has given the anti-foundational stance careful attention, Balkin 
appears to remain committed to the more traditional view that propositions of constitutional 
law correspond to facts. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18; see also Jack M. 
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diverge are several, but they all stem from the fundamental intuition that our 
Constitution is limited and the role of our judges in implementing that law is also 
limited, but not necessarily minimal. That is one of the reasons why the derision of 
Judge Bork and Justice Scalia is so persuasive. Many citizens were and remain 
surprised and unsettled by the far-reaching results that the modern federal courts 
stand prepared to order in the name of our Constitution. Others focus upon the 
failure of the Constitution to deliver justice, beginning with the Constitution’s 
original failure to free the slaves, and, indeed, the fundamental support it provided 
for the continuing enslavement of African Americans. 
It does not follow, however, that we need go so far as Sunstein47 in making a 
preeminent virtue out of minimalism. What can tell us when a decision like Brown, 
Griswold, Roe, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Korematsu, or Lawrence is correct, and 
when it is not? That question does not have a simple answer. The force of the anti-
foundational, anti-representational analysis of our constitutional law denies an 
answer that is as seemingly simple as that offered by originalism and the other 
representational theories that call upon us to discover the constitutional facts out 
there in the world. 
Yet we are not relegated to the purgatory of Justice Stewart’s response to the 
definition of obscenity,48 for a couple of reasons. First, we do not know the answer 
when we see it, in the sense of employing our faculty of constitutional perception. In 
                                                           
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771 (1994) (exploring 
the relationship of the descriptive and the normative in Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional 
Interpretation and arguing that Bobbitt’s distinction is untenable). Balkin appears to reject the 
anti-foundationalist position because he is committed to a privileged role for the original 
understanding. Balkin is clear that his is a theory of semantic original meaning. See BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 12-13. He believes, however, that where the 
constitutional language is that of broad principle, that the methods of constitutional 
construction are more open-ended than mere semantic analysis, encompassing all of Bobbitt’s 
modes. See id. at 4. Like many originalists, Balkin takes for granted that he can identify the 
level of generality at which the language of a provision of the Constitution speaks. See id. at 
14. There are reasons to be skeptical of that optimism. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. 
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-80 (1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF, READING] 
(defending the claim that constitutional texts cannot, within their four corners, determine the 
level of generality at which they are to be understood or applied). While I have defended an 
argument why Tribe and Dorf are mistaken in their claim, it is not clear how Balkin thinks he 
has rebutted the claim that there is a problem of generality. He never addresses the theory of 
meaning he is relying on, or the anti-foundational challenge directly. 
 47 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-48 
(1998) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING]. 
 48 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (famously 
acknowledging that it might be impossible to articulate a theory of, or standard for, obscenity, 
but claiming to “know it when I see it”). Bobbitt makes a cryptic, and seemingly provocative, 
claim when he touches on the structure of pornography. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 162 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (citing Nabokov on the 
formulaic nature of pornography, and suggesting that a constitutional rule of decision that 
generated determinable outcomes would strip judicial decision-making of its crucial element 
of judgment). It would be interesting to know whether any of Bobbitt’s readers were 
persuaded by the Nabokov citation. 
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a sense, that is a jurisprudential version of the private language error.49 We know 
constitutional truths by participating in a practice among the constitutional 
community that accepts propositions and the arguments that support those 
propositions, as well as the arguments that follow from them. 
Second, and more importantly, the way we know propositions of constitutional 
law is by trying them on, discussing them, and arguing for or against them with our 
community. The discussions and that community have many levels. We ordinarily 
focus almost exclusively upon the Supreme Court and the elite law faculties. But the 
relevant constitutional communities are more numerous and more diverse. Elected 
officials and citizens are also part of the conversation and the argument, each in 
different ways.50 But just as we can look back and identify the errors in the Warren 
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, so, too, we can correctly anticipate that a 
minimal Constitution would prove ultimately inadequate and incomplete. For 
example, the move from Naim v. Naim51 to Loving v. Virginia52 was an important 
and proper constitutional step, and one that would be discouraged or barred by a 
minimalist canon.53 The force of a judicial decision cannot be entirely clear unless 
and until the argument for that decision and its rationale are expressly announced. 
That is one of the important performative dimensions of a judicial decision.54 Thus, 
while a minimalist approach may have a place in our constitutional jurisprudence—
and there is a reading of Brown as a minimalist or, at least, incompletely theorized 
decision—minimalism cannot be our exclusive mode of constitutional argument or 
decision. 
The anti-representational, anti-foundational account of constitutional law 
advanced by Bobbitt and endorsed and developed by Dennis Patterson55 is hardly a 
common, intuitive account. Does the sophistication of that account count against the 
theory then? The complex account of constitutional law defended here is not a 
                                                           
 49 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 269-317 (G. E. M. 
Anscombe trans., 1953) (classical argument against the possibility of a private language on a 
variety of grounds, including that a rule cannot be followed privately). Just as we cannot have 
a private language, we do not have a private Constitution. The Constitution is a matter of its 
public understanding and the social and political practices that make it up. 
 50 A classic analysis of the popular Constitution is SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FAITH (1988) [hereinafter LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH]. 
 51 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam) (declining to find a federal question in challenge to 
anti-miscegenation law). 
 52 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finally striking down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute on equal 
protection and due process grounds). 
 53 Indeed, it was the Court’s unprincipled minimalism in the aftermath of Brown that 
appears most reprehensible today. It was, after all, the celebrated minimalist Justice 
Frankfurter who resisted so long and successfully the Court confronting the suspect 
constitutional status of the South’s anti-miscegenation laws. In hindsight, that choice by 
Justice Frankfurter has not been judged favorably by many. 
 54 Announcing the rationale for a decision enriches the statement of such a legal rule and 
enhances its ability to provide procedural regularity, thus enhancing the procedural fairness as 
well as substantive justice. See generally Scalia, Rules, supra note 43. 
 55 PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 36, at 169-72 (generalizing Bobbitt’s account of 
constitutional law to an account of law generally). 
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contribution to an argument as to what the Constitution should be applied to do; it is 
a jurisprudential theory of what the task of constitutional adjudication consists in. 
The complexity of the jurisprudential account defended here is not directly itself 
needed to make the arguments that we ordinarily deploy in the process of judicial 
constitutional decision-making. At most, the theory explains why the reductionist 
theories of the originalists and of Judge Posner, for example, or the elaborate 
philosophical theory of Dworkin are mistaken in their challenge to certain types of 
constitutional argument, broadly practiced today, as illegitimate. If that distinction 
between an account of constitutional argument and an argument in that constitutional 
practice is valid, then the complexity and counter-intuitiveness of this account does 
not stand as a clear disqualification. Indeed, to the extent that Bobbitt’s theory of 
constitutional law, like Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, leaves everything as 
it is,56 then the account would appear to have the marked merit of being an account 
of our constitutional practice that aptly describes that practice without need for 
radical revision.57 
B. Thinking about Constitutional Cases: Reimagining Practice 
It is helpful to consider the argumentative strategies that would be available to 
originalists and their critics in such a new world by considering three important and 
controversial recent Supreme Court cases and to imagine what such cases would 
look like without the overlay of the continuing originalism debate.58 I will sketch 
these cases only very lightly, highlighting rather than developing the threads of my 
argument that the opinions (and decisions) would likely improve substantially in a 
post-debate world. 
The first case is United States v. Jones.59 For lawyers educated in the past several 
decades and consumers of popular television and cinema crime dramas,60 Jones is 
hardly a surprising case: a unanimous Court held that when the police attach a GPS 
tracker to the personal automobile of an individual they execute a search subject to 
                                                           
 56 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 49, at § 124. Wittgenstein thus denies that there are profound 
philosophical problems that require, or even deserve, solution, only confusions arising from 
mistaking what language is about. See PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 36, at 181 (“In short, 
when it comes to law, I wish to leave everything as it is.”). 
 57 Contrast, for example, the radical revision of our constitutional doctrine that originalism 
would appear to require. See generally SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 6; RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) 
[hereinafter BARNETT, LOST] (arguing for substantial changes to our constitutional law, 
principally limiting the powers of the federal government and a more expansive understanding 
of personal freedoms). 
 58 In a sense, Fried undertakes such an analysis when he examines some recent cases. See 
Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1043-46 (2011) [hereinafter 
Fried, Judgment]. I am grateful to Professor Fried for having made a copy of this article 
available before publication. 
 59 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 60 In such police procedural dramas, the reading of Miranda warnings and the securing—
or denial—of warrants for physical searches and electronic surveillance are staples of the 
plots. See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 305-06 (2014) [hereinafter TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE]. 
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the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.61 The police suspected an 
individual of criminal drug activity and in the course of their investigation obtained a 
warrant that permitted them to attach a GPS tracker to the identified vehicle while in 
the District of Columbia and within ten days of the date the warrant was issued.62 
The police failed to comply with the terms of the warrant, attaching the GPS tracker 
to the vehicle in Maryland and only on the eleventh day after the warrant was 
issued.63 Jones is nevertheless a surprising case, because the Court revived the 
trespass theory of Olmstead v. United States64 and required three, strongly divergent 
opinions to reach its result.65 (Jones may be a strong argument itself for abandoning 
the debate over originalism, but the exploration of that question is beyond the scope 
of this Article.)66 
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, held that the installation of the 
GPS tracker on the defendant’s automobile constituted a trespass and, under the 
reasoning of Olmstead, an impermissible search.67 Justice Scalia invested significant 
effort into resurrecting the tort-based Fourth Amendment of Olmstead and, 
purportedly, of the Founding. To do so, he had to gloss over the nearly half-century 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that focused upon the expectations of the 
defendant, not upon her property rights.68 
Why was it important to Justice Scalia to move away from such established 
doctrine? First, the basis on which Justice Scalia decided the case appears to hew 
more closely to his originalist precepts. As his opinion emphasizes, the Fourth 
Amendment, on adoption, was generally understood in terms of trespass theory.69 
Justice Scalia’s argument does not tie back into the text of the Fourth Amendment. 
His most careful attention to the text of the Fourth Amendment appears when he 
asserts that it is “beyond dispute” that an automobile constitutes an effect.70 There is 
no discussion whatsoever in the Court’s opinion as to what the terms “secure” and 
                                                           
 61 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 62 Id. at 948. 
 63 Id. 
 64 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that a telephone wiretap installed in a physical 
location outside the premises or control of the defendant did not constitute a trespass and 
therefore was not an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 65 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 66 The exchange between two of the originalists on the Court, Justices Scalia and Alito, 
approaches the absurd in this case. It cannot but call up Marx’s celebrated assessment of the 
pattern of history on the elevation of Louis Napoleon: “[A]ll facts and personages of great 
importance in world history occur, as it were twice . . . the first time as tragedy, the second as 
farce.” KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON 15 (International 
Publishers 1963) (1852). 
 67 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50. 
 68 Id. at 950. 
 69 Id. at 949 (citing English case law contemporaneous with the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment for the grounding of that protection in property law). 
 70 Id. 
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“unreasonable” were understood to mean.71 Thus, the Court’s opinion is fully 
consistent with all three of the principal branches of originalism: the new, original 
understanding originalism, original expectations originalism, or classic original 
intentions originalism.72 Second, because the Fourth Amendment protects the people 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, it presents the same kinds of hazards for 
originalism as the Eighth Amendment. In interpreting the Fourth Amendment Justice 
Scalia faced the same specter that figured so prominently in the exchanges among 
Justice Scalia, Tribe, and Dworkin at Princeton.73 Thus, it was important for Justice 
Scalia to articulate more fully an originalist account of the Fourth Amendment in a 
case confronting new technology where there appeared to be a consensus or perhaps 
unanimity that the warrant requirement applied.74 
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the decision but sought to distance her reasoning 
from Justice Scalia’s revitalization of Olmstead’s trespass theory.75 Justice 
Sotomayor emphasized both the robust post-Katz v. United States expectation-of-
privacy line of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the earlier line based on tort 
theory.76 She also articulated a theory that explains why GPS monitoring poses novel 
Fourth Amendment challenges and suggested how the Court should view future 
questions regarding such “surreptitious” surveillance.77 The technology that permits 
GPS monitoring (and related digital data gathering) permits massive amounts of 
information to be obtained about individuals, their activities, and their likely beliefs 
almost invisibly and at little marginal cost. Justice Sotomayor suggested that we 
need a Fourth Amendment theory that emphasizes the expectations of privacy at the 
core of “associational and expressive freedoms”78 and the practical, prudential issues 
                                                           
 71 Justice Scalia makes a brief textual argument that the litany “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects” recited in the Amendment “reflects its close connection to property.” Id. That 
argument glosses over the first item in the list, persons, which would not appear property-
related because even the persons of slaves, although property, are not the persons whose rights 
are protected by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, it is far from clear that the confidentiality 
or privacy interest in papers protected by the Amendment is limited to cognizable property 
interests. Thus, the textual argument that Justice Scalia makes reinforces the character of his 
argument as little reliant on the constitutional text. 
 72 Thus, this case counts as evidence in favor of my claim that such distinctions are more 
formal than substantial. See LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim, supra note 39, at section II.C. 
 73 See generally SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14; Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter Dworkin, INTERPRETATION]; Laurence Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
Tribe, INTERPRETATION]. 
 74 See TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60. 
 75 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Of course, the Fourth 
Amendment is not concerned only with trespassory intrusions on property.”). 
 76 Id. at 954-55. 
 77 Id. at 955-57. Although Justice Sotomayor emphasized the covert nature of GPS 
tracking surveillance, it is not entirely clear how such surveillance differs from other more 
long-standing forms of surveillance—most of which is also covert. 
 78 Id. at 955-56. 
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raised by the new technology.79 Justice Sotomayor also raised the question of how 
the traditional exception to the warrant requirement for personal information 
voluntarily disclosed to a third party, on the basis that there is no expectation of 
privacy with regard to such information, applied to digital metadata and other forms 
of electronic information.80 Increasingly, a wide variety of locational and other 
metadata is available to cellular telephone service providers, and Justice Sotomayor 
posed the question of how our expectations of privacy and the protections afforded 
by the Fourth Amendment are to be understood.81 
Justice Alito concurred only in the judgment and also broke sharply with Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning.82 Justice Alito characterized the Court’s holding as “unwise . . . 
[with] little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and . . . highly 
artificial.”83 Justice Alito would apply the Fourth Amendment to prohibit such 
warrantless GPS tracking on the basis of the whether the defendant’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy were violated.84 In the case of anything more than “relatively 
short-term monitoring,” he found that a warrant was required because a defendant 
would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to such 
information.85 Justice Alito argued that the Court’s precedent demonstrates that 
trespass was neither necessary nor sufficient to find a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.86 He mocked the Court’s suggestion that the use 
of a GPS tracking device might be analogized to a constable secreting herself in a 
coach: 
The Court suggests that something like this might have occurred in 1791, 
but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, 
or both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and 
patience.87 
Justice Alito’s footnote captures the implausibility of Justice Scalia’s forced 
originalist analysis because there simply was no eighteenth-century analogue to GPS 
monitoring. Justice Alito instead proposed a doctrinal argument that relied on the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment Katz88 jurisprudence with respect to electronic 
surveillance.89 As Justice Alito noted, the Court’s reliance on common-law tort 
                                                           
 79 Id. at 956-57. 
 80 Id. at 957. 
 81 Id. at 957. Justice Sotomayor’s question proved prescient when Edward Snowden 
subsequently revealed the magnitude of telecommunication data being routinely captured by 
federal security services without the benefit of a warrant. 
 82 Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 83 Id. at 958. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 964. 
 86 Id. at 960. 
 87 Id. at 958 n.3. 
 88 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 89 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959-60. 
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concepts appeared similar to the Court’s earlier reluctance to apply the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment to electronic surveillance because of the absence of physical 
intrusion.90  Justice Alito argued that grounding the constitutional right on the 
common-law tort doctrine created anomalies and discontinuities in Fourth 
Amendment law that were neither necessary nor desirable.91 
Justice Alito did not directly address why he was willing to abandon or 
compromise his originalist jurisprudence—except insofar as his mockery of Justice 
Scalia’s analysis suggests that he tacitly concluded that such an originalist analysis 
was untenable. Certainly, on its face, new originalism’s distinction between 
interpretation and construction is not helpful in any relevant way. Perhaps simply 
drawing out the context necessary to construct an originalist analysis is enough to 
call that analysis into question. 
The three opinions in Jones are shaped by a number of factors, but the ongoing 
debate over originalism is an important element in all three. In the case of the 
Court’s opinion by Justice Scalia, the analysis is informed by his commitment to the 
original understandings, intentions, and expectations with respect to the 
constitutional text. Justice Scalia wants to show that a robust originalist Fourth 
Amendment is sufficient to restrict warrantless GPS tracking. Justice Scalia also 
wants to challenge the post-Katz Fourth Amendment doctrine that he regards as 
inconsistent with the original understanding.92 But in so doing, he pays scant 
attention to the constitutional text or to its original understanding. By contrast, 
Justice Sotomayor uses the case as an opportunity to articulate an expansive Fourth 
Amendment theory. That theory relies upon doctrinal and ethical arguments, 
although the latter are invoked only tacitly.93 Finally, perhaps most interestingly, 
Justice Alito directly challenges Justice Scalia’s originalist defense of the decision, 
mocking the notion of a very small eighteenth-century constable secreted in a very 
large coach. Instead, Justice Alito wants to apply the Fourth Amendment to prohibit 
such warrantless GPS tracking on the basis of whether the defendant’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy were violated. Justice Alito was prepared to follow the 
Court’s historic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—albeit more narrowly than 
Justice Sotomayor would articulate—and apply that law. He does not appear to 
believe that such doctrine ought to be applicable only if (if at all, perhaps) the 
originalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is unavailable. But none of the 
opinions address these methodological stakes directly or forthrightly. 
Now consider what the Jones opinions and decision might have looked like if the 
arguments made in this Article were accepted, and the worldview imposed upon us 
by the ongoing debate over originalism were forsaken. If we imagine Jones decided 
with the full array of constitutional arguments available to the Court, and without the 
                                                           
 90 Id. at 959. 
 91 Id. at 961-62. The majority responded to this challenge by noting that it did not make 
the tort law analysis an exclusive test for a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 953 
(majority opinion). 
 92 Thus, while Justice Sotomayor characterizes the Katz jurisprudence as enlarging the 
historic analysis of the Fourth Amendment protections, Justice Scalia characterizes that 
jurisprudence as deviating from the historic analysis. Id. at 950; id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
 93 Justice Sotomayor does not expressly couch her arguments in such terms. 
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methodological claims against particular modes of constitutional argument made by 
the protagonists in the debate, the case becomes simpler and the opinions more 
compelling. The issues in Jones would appear to implicate potential textual, 
structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical arguments; it might also implicate 
historical arguments.94 The historical arguments that might have been made could 
have looked to the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment in the colonial 
experience of criminal law enforcement practices of the British colonial authorities 
and the common law.95 But if the Court did not seek to decide Jones on the basis of a 
historical argument or, indeed, even to consider such arguments, the forced analogy 
that it implicitly constructs, and which the concurring opinion calls out and 
lampoons, would not be necessary. If historical arguments cannot provide us 
guidance to decide the case, other modes may be deployed with more force. 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion does a good job making the doctrinal 
argument for the result in Jones.96 The prudential arguments that might be made 
against the result in the case get short shrift, however, by the majority and by the 
concurring opinions.97 Because the law enforcement authorities had, in fact, obtained 
a warrant but then proceeded to disregard its terms, the Court may have concluded 
that the facts of Jones demonstrated that requiring warrants for such new forms of 
surveillance presented a manageable challenge for law enforcement. Prudential 
arguments might emphasize the greater threat that the Republic now faces because of 
the rise of global terrorism and the availability of portable and easily deployed 
weapons of mass destruction, but those were not the facts presented in Jones. 
Thoughtful commentators find those risks to create powerful arguments,98 and as 
prudential arguments they have a place in constitutional adjudication.99 At the end of 
the day, sufficiently compelling prudential arguments are unlikely to be disregarded; 
at most they may simply be masked. Those prudential arguments therefore deserved 
a broader articulation and exploration in Jones.100 Such a discussion would 
strengthen the opinion and the decision, whether it changed the result, or not. 
                                                           
 94 To the extent that the technological changes that made the question of Jones possible, 
the historical argument would appear less powerful. This insight is captured by Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion, as discussed above. The problem of technological change, while 
traditionally addressed by originalists, undoubtedly poses important challenges for them. See 
generally LeDuc, Originalism’s Implications, supra note 5, at section II.D (discussing the 
treatment of constitutional flux in the debate over originalism). 
 95 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 64-
75 (1998) (arguing that the historical understanding was very different from modern Fourth 
Amendment doctrine). 
 96 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 97 See id. at 945 (majority opinion); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 98 See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 34 (describing the expansive reading of the War 
Powers Clause and the concept of the unitary executive in designing antiterrorism programs in 
the early twenty-first century); POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 68. 
 99 See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6, at 59-74. 
 100 See POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 150-52 (developing prudential arguments 
for permitting modestly invasive governmental surveillance while preserving other traditional 
civil liberties). 
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Most importantly, the opinions in Jones ought to have engaged with the opposing 
positions in a more thoughtful way. Because the proponents were committed to their 
respective methodological stances in the originalism debate, they could not engage 
persuasively the opposing arguments. That claim may appear puzzling, because on 
their face all of the opinions appear to address and engage the arguments made in the 
other opinions.101 Thus, for example, Justices Scalia and Alito directly engage with 
respect to the question whether there was a meaningful analogue to GPS tracking in 
the eighteenth century—the constable of small stature secreted in the large coach, as 
Justice Alito styles it.102 Justice Scalia asserts that such a possibility is not difficult to 
imagine.103 Justice Scalia has allowed his originalist exuberance to get the better of 
his judgment. Such a hypothetical not only was not contemplated at the time the Bill 
of Rights was adopted—it could not have been contemplated. Students of original 
meaning originalism will be puzzled by the absence of inquiry into the original 
understanding of the meaning of “effect” and of “search” in the opinions of either 
Justice Scalia or Justice Alito—and the absence of any such inquiry by Justice 
Thomas. 
The issues raised are more fundamental than that formulation may suggest. 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion articulates the novel Fourth Amendment issues that 
GPS tracking presents. Those issues make Jones more interesting and important than 
my introductory characterization acknowledges. Justice Sotomayor is correct when 
she emphasizes the cost efficiency of such surveillance, the wealth of data captured 
for law enforcement, and the ability to conduct such surveillance without customary 
community awareness.104 None of that is captured in the exchange between Justices 
Scalia and Alito. It is not captured, of course, because neither is engaged by Justice 
Sotomayor’s argument. While disagreeing about the possibility of an originalist 
answer to the question presented in Jones, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Alito 
wants to inquire into the constitutional import of the wealth of data captured by GPS 
tracking or into the fundamental elements that inform an analysis of the expectation 
of privacy in our society.105 Those questions require a decision-making approach far 
less formal than that each employs. That is the critical sense in which, despite the 
pretense of engaging in argument with the claims presented by the other opinions, 
there is little meaningful exchange. 
If we posit the transcendence of the ongoing debate over originalism, the 
opinions that would be written, I submit, would look very different. Justice Scalia 
could make his argument for the application of the Fourth Amendment based upon 
                                                           
 101 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (majority opinion); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (criticizing Justice Alito’s willingness to disregard the trespass foundation for 
Fourth Amendment protection); id. at 959-62 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 102 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 103 Id. at 951 (majority opinion). 
 104 See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). As the National Security Agency’s 
telephone surveillance program reveals, other digital surveillance techniques also deliver very 
intrusive and efficient surveillance results to the policy and security services. 
 105 While Justice Alito employs the concept of the reasonable expectations of privacy in his 
concurrence, he does so cautiously, noting, among other concerns, its circularity. Moreover, 
unlike Justice Sotomayor, he does not explore in any detail the fundamental challenges 
modern technology poses to traditional privacy rights. 
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the long-standing understanding that he champions. He could expressly engage on 
the weaknesses in a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence grounded on an analysis of 
expectations of privacy. Indeed, he could engage Justice Sotomayor’s claim that 
expectations of privacy—and the right to control the publication or dissemination of 
personal beliefs and other personal information—is a fundamental part of our 
associational and expressive freedoms. Those arguments could be engaged directly 
and substantively, rather than ignored on the basis of an originalist methodological 
stance. The result would be a stronger and more persuasive opinion. 
Correspondingly, Justice Alito would have a stronger opinion if he engaged Justice 
Sotomayor’s argument more directly. Justice Alito might have explored how third-
party access to such electronic information ought to be taken into account in 
determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, while Justice Alito 
acknowledged some of the salient features of the new technology, he did not 
articulate what the implications of those features ought to be for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  
Finally, consider the opinions in Jones under Sunstein’s minimalist approach. 
That approach would discount or dismiss my criticism of the gaps in the Justices’ 
analysis and argument for their respective positions. All three Justices agree on the 
result. Sunstein’s enthusiasm for incompletely theorized agreements might suggest 
that there was no need for the three opinions and no need for Justice Scalia to engage 
even in the limited way that he did with the concurring opinions. Such a stance is not 
plausible. The theoretical differences among these three decisions warrant, in our 
constitutional law practice, acknowledgment and articulation. By appealing to the 
nature of our constitutional practice, I am appealing to that practice as operating, at 
least in part, in the space of reasons. It may be that Sunstein would allow the 
articulation of the competing theories in Jones even under his minimalist theory. 
That theory focuses on cases in which there are substantive disagreements about 
outcomes, as well as disagreements about principles and theories.106 In Jones, the 
disagreement was only about principles and theories. But those disagreements 
foreshadow disagreements as to outcomes in other cases. Sunstein would not endorse 
anticipating those outcome disagreements by engaging on the clear disagreements 
over theories and principles. 
Sunstein’s minimalism sacrifices the richness of our constitutional practice in its 
effort to avoid the hard constitutional questions. Argument is central to our 
constitutional practice, and the arguments that the Court endorses or rejects 
fundamentally shape our understanding of the decision of a case. The rule of a case 
encompasses and is informed by the arguments that support it and even by the 
arguments that are rejected for it. Moreover, expressly articulating the foundations 
and arguments for a constitutional decision better enables that decision to be 
understood and assessed.   
Second, consider the controversial and important decision107 National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).108 That case considers several 
                                                           
 106 See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 47, at 35-48. 
 107 A wide array of commentators promptly anointed NFIB as a landmark case. See, e.g., 
TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 54-55 (asserting that NFIB “ranks 
among the most anticipated and controversial [Supreme Court] decisions in American 
history.”). 
 108 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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constitutional questions relating to the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, 
including whether such Act was within the power of Congress to enact under the 
Commerce Clause.109 In relevant part, the Affordable Care Act requires individuals 
to secure at least a minimal level of health insurance,110 and imposed a penalty if 
such insurance were not obtained.111 Additionally, the Act required states to expand 
their Medicaid coverage;112 failing to do so would result in the loss of all of a state’s 
Medicaid funding.113 The Court addressed the validity of both parts of the 
Affordable Care Act in NFIB.114 Turning first to the individual insurance mandate 
and associated penalty, the Court tested the imposition of such obligations first under 
the Commerce Clause and then under the Taxing Power.115 The Court held that the 
imposition of a financial penalty for an individual’s failure to obtain insurance was 
invalid under the Commerce Clause116 In so holding, the Court distinguished 
between regulating commerce and requiring that persons engage in commerce.117 
The Court held that the individual mandate imposed a requirement that individuals 
who might otherwise not be participating in commerce subject to regulation enter 
into such commerce by purchasing insurance.118 By so characterizing the operation 
of the Affordable Care Act, the Court held that it exceeded Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause. 
The Court upheld the penalty enforcing the individual mandate, however, as a 
valid exercise of the federal government’s Taxing Power.119 The analysis of the 
question whether the penalty on individuals under the Act qualified as a tax was 
somewhat technical but ultimately did not turn on a formal analysis, but on a 
substantive analysis that the amount of the penalty and the extent to which 
individuals would choose to pay the penalty rather than purchase insurance 
demonstrated that the imposition was a tax rather than a penalty.120 
Justice Ginsburg would have upheld the imposition on individuals who failed to 
obtain insurance under the Commerce Clause.121 Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent 
that the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence traditionally upheld legislation with 
respect to activities substantially affecting interstate commerce if such legislation 
                                                           
 109 Id. at 2578-79. 
 110 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012). 
 111 Id. § 5000A(b) (2012) (designated as a shared responsibility payment). 
 112 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(A)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). 
 113 Id. § 1396d (2012). 
 114 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566. 
 115 Id. at 2584. 
 116 Id. at 2590-91, 2593. 
 117 Id. at 2590-91 (“[W]e have never permitted Congress to anticipate that activity itself in 
order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce.”). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 2600. 
 120 Id. at 2596-600. 
 121 Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
206 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:185 
 
had a rational basis.122 Justice Ginsburg asserted that the individual insurance 
mandate handily met those tests.123 She dismissed the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish legislation requiring persons to enter into interstate commerce from 
legislation regulating such commerce in the case of uninsured persons under the 
United States health care system.124 
Four Justices would have held the individual mandate invalid.125 In an unusual 
step, apparently signaling an emphasis on, or intensity with respect to, the dissent, all 
four Justices asserted authorship.126 The dissent would have invalidated the 
individual mandate,127 and in so doing, effectively eviscerated the Act, because 
without mandatory coverage the regulatory requirement of universal availability 
despite pre-existing conditions would be unworkable.128 The dissent argued that the 
Affordable Care Act “impressed into service . . . healthy individuals.”129 It was this 
power to command that the dissent would deny.130  
The Court also addressed the requirement that states expand their Medicaid 
coverage or forfeit existing federal financial support.131 At issue was whether 
withholding federal funding to induce the states to adopt certain changes was a valid 
exercise of the federal government’s spending power.132 The Court struck that 
requirement down on the basis that while the federal government may provide 
incentives to the states to adopt federally favored policies,133 it cannot coerce the 
states to do so.134 The Court found the financial cost to a state of not implementing 
                                                           
 122 Id. at 2616-18. 
 123 Id. at 2617. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 126 TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 238. 
 127 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 128 Free riders who obtained insurance only at or approaching the hospital could operate 
without restriction under such a regime. In such a case, the cost of insurance would need be 
substantially increased because of the absence of premiums paid by healthy insureds. 
 129 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646. 
 130 Somewhat puzzlingly, the dissent suggested that there were financial incentives or 
coercive measures that Congress could have chosen that would have been permissible, 
including surcharges or the denial of tax credits when the free riders ultimately enter the 
system. It is hardly clear that the dissent is correct in its policy judgment that these methods 
would work, and there are many reasons to doubt that they would. Id. at 2647. 
 131 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 at 2601-05 (majority opinion). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute reducing a 
state’s federal highway funding if it failed to raise its minimum drinking age on the basis that 
such reduction nevertheless allowed the states to make their own decisions on the issue—
notwithstanding that all states did, in fact, make such changes in order to preserve such full 
funding). 
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the expansion of Medicaid to be so large as to be coercive.135 Accordingly, the loss 
of Medicaid funding for states that chose not to expand coverage was struck 
down.136 Justice Ginsburg, joined only by Justice Sotomayor, would have upheld the 
requirement upon the states that they expand Medicaid coverage as a valid exercise 
of the federal spending power.137 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Court had 
never previously limited the federal spending power and that the Medicaid statute 
expressly made continuing funding subject to compliance with all applicable 
requirements.138  
NFIB has aroused and, as of this writing, continues to arouse, intense 
controversy.139 Only the implications of the originalism debate and its tacit 
foundations are relevant here, however. I want to begin by exploring briefly the 
claims, made by the Left140 and the Right,141 in the Court142 and in the academy,143 
that the issue underlying the constitutional controversy in NFIB was the nature of 
freedom in our constitutional republic. Both sides in the debate treated the 
Affordable Care Act as constraining individual freedom; the disagreement was about 
whether such governmental intrusion by the federal government was permissible. 
Two questions warrant exploration. First, if that account is correct, how does that 
controversy translate into a question of constitutional law? Second, does that account 
undermine this Article’s claims about the role of the debate over originalism and its 
claim that abandoning the debate over originalism would allow us to reconstruct our 
constitutional discourse? 
                                                           
 134 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (“In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has 
chosen . . . is a gun to the head [of the states] . . . .”). In the case of individuals, it is easy 
enough to understand the coercive force of a gun put to the head by another, but in the case of 
a sovereign state the metaphor is not as perspicuous as the Court may have assumed.  
 135 Id. Again, the critical concept of coercion of a sovereign was not articulated or 
defended. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 138 Id. at 2630. 
 139 Dean Martha Minow famously remarked about the opinions in NFIB that “[r]eading the 
two opinions . . . is a bit like traveling between two countries speaking different languages.” 
Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and the Affordable 
Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121 (2012); see also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (2013). 
 140 See, e.g., TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 68 (arguing that all of 
the opinions in NFIB “rest on contradictory views of American freedom and federalism.”). 
 141 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010) [hereinafter, 
Barnett, Commandeering]. 
 142 See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (characterizing the Court’s authoritative interpretation of the Commerce Clause as 
“crabbed.”). 
 143 TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 68. 
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Both the Left and the Right claimed that NFIB presented a question of the nature 
of freedom in our Republic.144 Randy Barnett, a leading proponent of the New 
Originalism, defends originalism from the foundation of a libertarian, natural law 
foundation.145 Barnett argues that there is a fundamental distinction between doing 
and not doing, and that the requirement of the Act that individuals purchase health 
insurance (subject to the exceptions noted above) or face a monetary penalty, is 
constitutionally impermissible because it mandates action rather than prohibiting 
action or conduct.146 Acts of commission and acts of omission are distinguished in 
Thomist philosophy and that distinction may underlie the distinction between action 
and inaction.147 But that distinction had not previously figured in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause.148 
The distinction between action and inaction is initially both appealing and 
intuitive. We think that we know the difference between action and inaction and we 
think that that distinction makes a difference in a variety of important contexts. For 
example, our intuitions about the difference between action and inaction factors 
prominently in widely shared intuitions about the differences between the questions 
raised by the various iterations of the trolley problem.149 That philosophical problem 
asks us to consider the circumstances in which we would act to save five lives while 
allowing or causing one person to die. The extent to which the action directly or 
necessarily results in the death of the one figures prominently in the intuitions of 
many as to the propriety of such actions.150 Taking an action that is intended or must 
result in the death of an individual is ordinarily thought to be importantly different 
from a failure to take an action that would save an individual’s life. The distinction 
between action and inaction is important in the law, too. Tort and criminal law 
                                                           
 144 See Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 141, at 605; see also TRIBE & MATZ, 
UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 52-87. 
 145 BARNETT, LOST, supra note 57 (articulating a natural law theory of originalism); see 
also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2000) 
[hereinafter BARNETT, LIBERTY]. 
 146 Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 141, at 605. 
 147 While the concepts are of acts of omission and of commission are distinguished, both 
are treated as types of acts. It is notable that even those Justices who are, and Justice Scalia 
who was, generally sympathetic with elements in such philosophy failed to acknowledge or 
address that foundation.  
 148  Defenders of the Court’s decision would assert that imposing such a general 
obligation under the authority of the Commerce Clause was unprecedented; critics would 
emphasize that such a distinction was without precedent in the Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. 
 149 See PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in 
VIRTUES AND VICES 19, 23 (1978) (posing the so-called trolley problem: under shat 
circumstances, if any, should one act to save multiple human lives at the cost of one other 
life). 
 150 See DAVID EDMONDS, WOULD YOU KILL THE FAT MAN? THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND 
WHAT YOUR ANSWER TELLS US ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG (2013) (recent exploration of the 
burgeoning trolley problem—and its closely related fat man on a bridge or in the mouth of a 
cave  problem—thinking). 
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distinguish action and inaction in prescribing standards of conduct.151 Thus, 
distinguishing action and inaction has played an important role in law and in our 
thinking more generally about the proper rules for human behavior. 
But it is less clear why such a distinction should figure in the delimitation of the 
federal government’s authority under the Commerce Clause. One argument made by 
the Court152 and in the academic literature153 is that if the Commerce Clause power 
extends to inaction then there can be no meaningful limit to that power,154 and the 
absence of such a limit is inconsistent with the fundamental premise that our federal 
government is a government of limited powers.155 The flaw in the argument is that 
the government in NFIB did not regulate just any inactivity. It claimed the authority 
to regulate certain inactivity with significant financial consequences for inactive 
individuals who did not conform to the regulatory requirements.156 The Court would 
not need to endorse Sunstein’s position on judicial minimalism to be confident that it 
could uphold the Affordable Care Act’s treatment of the failure to obtain insurance 
without finding itself committed to the position that the federal power under the 
Commerce Clause is without limitation. The dissent also questioned whether 
describing the failure to purchase insurance could properly be best described as 
inaction.157 I want to explore only the second argument here. 
The claim that a failure to purchase insurance is a failure to act—to purchase 
insurance—is plausible and engaging. But when individuals choose not to purchase 
                                                           
 151 See Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 141, at 606, n.98. 
 152 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587-91 (2012). 
 153 Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 141, at 607 (arguing that the authority to mandate 
activity “would open the door for an infinite variety of mandates in the future.”).  
 154 I have charitably restated the reductio as proving only that there is no meaningful limit 
to federal power (although some of the protagonists assert the conclusion less precisely) 
because there are, of course, certain kinds of activity and inactivity that are not a matter of 
commerce. See generally DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2010). Narrowing the objectionable conclusion in this manner 
would not diminish the force of the argument, were it correct. The range of goods and service 
bought and sold in the marketplace is sufficiently great that the ability to require the purchase 
or sale of any good bought or sold in the market would still accord the federal government 
very great authority under the Commerce Clause. 
 155 Despite its widespread assertion, this proposition is not easily traced back to the 
constitutional text or to the central historical documents of the Founding. Thus, the discussion 
of the powers of the federal government in The Federalist Papers emphasizes the ability of 
the states and, ultimately, the people to prevent arrogation of power by the federal 
government. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). Thus, when Randy 
Barnett addresses the question of the scope of the federal authority under the Commerce 
Clause, his historical argument is tenuous and strained. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 57, at 
274-76. 
 156 For a description of these consequences, see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157 See id. at 2611 (describing the choice not to insure as a decision to be a free rider by 
shifting potential health care costs to other participants in the health care system as patients or 
providers). 
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insurance, they are choosing certain other consequences.158 For example, given the 
federal and state regulatory system applicable to hospital emergency rooms,159 the 
individual is making a complex choice relating to how any future emergency room 
care will be provided. If the individual has the financial ability to pay for such 
treatment, she will pay the rack rate for such services at that time, effectively self-
insuring. If the individual does not have the ability to pay for such services, she will 
receive basic care at the expense of others within the health care system, in all 
likelihood those with insurance. If the individual dies immediately or emigrates from 
the United States without need or opportunity for medical services to be rendered 
such an individual will also have self-insured against a risk that never arises. Thus, 
this conduct and choice is akin to making a bet, playing an informal lottery. The 
decision in NFIB and the four dissenters would simply characterize such a choice 
and the consequences that flow from it as inaction.  
Actions, inaction, and other events may generally be described in many different 
ways. It is not clear that characterizing such an individual choice as inaction is the 
best relevant or salient characterization. In Newtonian physics force must be exerted 
on an object with mass to change the motion of that object, whether at rest or in 
motion. By analogy, it would appear that in the absence of insurance it would require 
an action to obtain insurance, and that inaction would result in the continued absence 
of insurance. But consider Cass Sunstein’s paternalistic nudge strategy.160 What if 
the default for individuals otherwise without insurance were made inclusive in some 
onerous form of federal health insurance (or private insurance assigned, say, by 
lottery) by operation of law, and that such insurance could be declined by an 
individual by making an affirmative election out of such coverage? Such a regime 
would be like the Medicare system, albeit with an opt-out option. Assume, 
moreover, that an individual could make such election freely, except that the 
consequence would be that financial tax or penalty provided for the uninsured by the 
Affordable Care Act. 
The analysis of the Court and the four dissenters suggests that such a Sunsteinian 
approach would be permissible under the Commerce Clause. Under that regulatory 
regime, the event triggering the imposition of the penalty is the affirmative act out of 
the otherwise mandatory default health insurance coverage. It might be argued that 
such a default approach simply makes the trigger appear to be an act, and that the 
election out is really inaction. The assumption is that in the state of nature that serves 
as the benchmark for measuring action and inaction healthcare is uninsured. But that 
assumption appears somewhat arbitrary and conceptual to provide the foundation for 
the determination of the scope of the federal authority under the Commerce Clause. 
                                                           
 158 See id. at 2610-11. Of course, individuals may also find themselves in such a position 
without having considered such possibilities or potential outcomes; in such a case it is more 
difficult to characterize such individuals as having made a choice.  
 159 See id. at 2611. 
 160 See generally RICHARD  H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,  NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (defending the design of governmental 
regulations that establish default choices and other non-binding measures that result in better 
outcomes); see also SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 
(2012) (defending an expanded role for the state to limit individual freedom where empirical 
evidence shows that individuals fail to act rationally in their own self-interest).  
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That example makes me doubt that the action-inaction distinction is a compelling 
basis on which to determine the scope of such authority. 
The highly formal reasoning in NFIB and the inability of the various opinions to 
engage the arguments proffered appears to reflect some of the same weaknesses that 
have affected the debate over originalism and appear to derive from the same 
sources. Both sides assumed that there was an objective answer to the questions 
about the scope of the Commerce Clause and the scope of the freedom accorded 
individuals in the Republic. Those assumptions helped make the arguments in NFIB 
as unpersuasive as they were. 
Second, to the extent that the disagreement in NFIB was grounded in different 
conceptions of liberty, that source of the controversy is not inconsistent with the 
account of the debate over originalism that I am defending. I am not arguing that 
ontological and philosophy of language disagreements are the exclusive source of 
constitutional controversy. Indeed, I think that there are also fundamental differences 
of political philosophy161 as well as other jurisprudential differences162 that help 
shape the debate. There are also substantive differences about the Constitution in our 
constitutional controversies. Indeed, much of the argument here is that transcending 
the sterile methodological disputes in the originalism debate permits us to address 
the substantive issues directly, clearly, and forthrightly. 
The disagreements about the nature of liberty and the relationship of individual 
freedom to the state were shaped and channeled by the premises of the debate over 
originalism. All sides in the constitutional controversy over the Affordable Care Act 
tacitly accepted that there was an independent constitutional answer to be determined 
or found, not a constitutional choice to be made.163 Many of the protagonists in the 
struggle over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act joined that controversy 
as participants in the debate over originalism. As a result, that substantive 
controversy was viewed, in substantial part, from within the methodological 
perspectives of the protagonists in the debate over originalism. Thus, when Chief 
Justice Roberts intoned in judgment that the Act intruded too far into the freedom of 
citizens, “[t]hat is not the country that the Framers of our Constitution 
envisioned,”164 he tacitly assumed that there was an answer to the question he faced 
in the Constitution, not that he faced a constitutional choice that must be made. The 
                                                           
 161 See generally LeDuc, Political Philosophy, supra note 39. 
 162 See generally André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and Pragmatism in the Debate 
about Originalism, OHIO N. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); André LeDuc, The Nature of our 
Constitutional Practice: Unstated Premises about Formalism and Interpretation in the Debate 
over Originalism (Feb. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (exploring 
the tacit premises about positivism, formalism, and the nature of constitutional interpretation 
that figure importantly in the debate over originalism). 
 163 See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). When the Court obviously 
chooses a specification (as it did, for example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014), when it articulated a temporal standard to determine when a Senate recess would or 
might be long enough to permit the President to invoke the Recess Appointments Clause) it 
does not employ express language of choice, but it does eschew purporting to find the rule in 
the constitutional text. 
 164 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589. The focus was on what was originally expected, not on an 
original understanding of the constitutional text. See generally Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 73. 
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notion that we can consider and assess the constitutional status of alternative 
holdings in NFIB on the basis of their fit with the country envisioned by the 
Founders is, like the question of the Founders’ view of the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to GPS tracking devices, entirely implausible and faintly comic. As a 
result, the arguments made were not principally intended to defend such a choice and 
rebut the claims of those who would make a different choice; they were rather to 
prove that the underlying originalist Constitution provided for the result reached. 
Finally, let us imagine what the opinions in NFIB would look like if they were 
written without the parameters and constraints of the debate about originalism. The 
two issues decided in the case would appear to implicate textual, historical, doctrinal, 
structural, and prudential arguments. In a world in which the various forms of 
constitutional argument were not being called into question by the debate over 
originalism, we may anticipate that the various modes of argument would receive a 
fuller and more complete deployment. Two points warrant particular mention.165 
First, the distinction between action and inaction pressed into service by both the 
Court and the dissent would have warranted and received more careful scrutiny. The 
majority appealed to the concept as if it were obvious that such a distinction would 
undermine the foundational principle of limited federal powers. The dissent similarly 
emphasized the importance of the distinction but offered no further explanation of 
why that distinction ought to matter.166 
It may be that the government mishandled the briefing and oral argument in 
NFIB, and that its failure to acknowledge that its power under the Commerce Clause 
to mandate standards was not unlimited appeared to create the claim to an unlimited 
authority under the Commerce Clause.167 The Solicitor General ought to have 
acknowledged that the authority claimed is not unlimited and that the authority to 
mandate that individuals act is derivative of the consequences their choices have on 
                                                           
 165 Two less central points are worth noting as well. First, whether the individual mandate 
implicates an ethical argument. While it might for those of certain faiths, such belief-based 
objections to the mandate were recognized in the Act and an exception from the obligation 
provided. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2) (2012). There would not otherwise appear to be a question 
that would implicate ethical argument in NFIB. The individual mandate would appear to 
present the potential to raise such issues but would not appear to actually present such issues 
because of the statutory faith-based exclusions; the provision for the expansion of Medicaid, 
coupled with the financial penalty for failures to do so, whether that provision is best 
characterized as an incentive or as a coercive measure, would not appear to implicate the 
kinds of matters that fall within the ambit of ethical argument. 
  Second, does the analysis by the Court and the other Justices confirm Sunstein’s 
argument for minimalism? For example, the federal legislation in NFIB raises real federalism 
questions, and, in particular, the question of drawing the line between coercion and 
incentive—a potentially difficult line, in any world—in the context of our federal system. 
Alternatively, an explanation of why such a distinction is unnecessary, incomplete or 
misleading would appear analytically valuable. The Court’s discussion of this question 
appears thin and unenlightening. It is hard to believe that saying more would be saying too 
much, pace Sunstein. So the lengthy opinions in NFIB do not appear to support Sunstein’s 
argument. See generally SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 47; see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE]. 
 166 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 167 Certainly the dissent so suggests. Id. 
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commerce within the accepted ambit of the federal authority. Absent such 
consequences, the federal government has no authority under the Commerce Clause. 
There is, thus, no real specter of an unlimited federal authority. 
None of this, on its face, however, appears to implicate the originalism debate. 
Nevertheless, the originalism debate—or at least, the penumbra of the originalism 
debate—reaches the judicial decision-making in NFIB. The competing concepts or 
conceptions of freedom168 underlying the controversy over the Affordable Care Act 
implicate fundamental premises about and foundations of our democratic republic. 
Chief Justice Roberts reflected this understanding when he appealed to the vision of 
the Founders.169 But he did so only in a formulaic way, in the manner of the claims 
made often by the originalists in the debate, not in a manner that might have 
persuaded the Justices holding an opposing view. Similarly, the concurring opinion 
found no need to engage meaningfully with the Court’s claims about the Founding 
vision. That appeal, if concretized in the context of the challenge to the Affordable 
Care Act, could potentially have been very powerful. Made in NFIB only as an 
abstract claim, like the claim about freedom, do not tie back easily into the 
constitutional text. That casualness is mirrored by a corresponding insensitivity in 
originalism’s critics’ disregard for the arguments from history and text. 
Second, the Court employed another emotionally powerful concept—the notion 
that the federal government had enacted legislation designed to coerce the sovereign 
states to expand their Medicaid coverage—to support a holding that the Affordable 
Care Act’s mechanism to support and achieve expanded Medicaid coverage was 
invalid.170 Like the Court’s appeal to the distinction between action and inaction, that 
concept of coercion was not well defined. The Court never defined what measure or 
metric of financial incentive became coercive or even the measure—absolute dollars, 
relative dollars by reference to a state’s budget, relative dollars by reference to 
spending on a particular category or function, or some other measure—that would be 
employed to test coercive effect.171 
In a world without the ongoing originalism debate, Randy Barnett would not 
suddenly endorse the individual mandate or the proposed expansion of Medicaid, nor 
would Justice Ginsburg necessarily abandon her endorsement of the Affordable Care 
Act’s expansion of Medicaid by depriving states that failed to enact the required 
expansion of their federal funding. There are substantial, substantive differences 
between them. But the constitutional arguments that would be made on both sides 
ought to be more persuasive if all sides in the debate would accept that their 
opinions, to be effective, must ultimately be persuasive—not merely explanatory of 
                                                           
 168 The notions of freedom of the protagonists in NFIB were so different that I am unsure 
whether they were different “concepts” or different “conceptions.” See RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE]. 
 169 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2589. 
 170 Id. at 2604. 
 171 Compare id. (referring to total dollars and federal support as a percentage of a state’s 
overall budget), with id. at 2639-41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(exploring the complexities of the hypothetical counterfactual analysis of the majority 
purporting to measure whether a financial inducement was coercive and concluding that such 
a determination likely required a court to make judgments that rendered such a question non-
justiciable).  
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the particular position adopted.172 Thus, the debate over originalism and the 
acknowledgment that neither position can persuade the other side likely has a 
corrosive effect more generally in our contemporary judicial argument and public 
discourse. 
The third and final case I consider here, National Labor Relations Board v. Noel 
Canning,173 was also highly controversial.174 It presented a classic separation of 
powers question. The question at issue was whether the National Labor Relations 
Board had been authorized to act when it satisfied its requisite quorum only by 
including members who had been purportedly properly appointed under the Recess 
Appointments Clause.175 If such appointments were invalid, then the requisite 
quorum was absent, and the Board’s action was invalid. In a unanimous decision, the 
Court held the appointments were invalid, and therefore that the Board’s action was 
invalid and without legal force or effect.176 But the Court and the concurring 
Justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, differed fundamentally in their analysis. 
The Court determined that the Senate was not in recess as a result of the pro forma 
sessions it held while it remained, as a substantive matter, in recess.177 In the absence 
of a recess, the President could not invoke his authority under the Recess 
Appointments Clause.178 Thus, the Court recognized an important role for the Recess 
Appointments Clause that the concurring Justices would deny.179 It is this split in the 
Court that I want to explore here in the context of the debate over originalism and 
the foundations that underlie it. 
The case presented three questions regarding the Recess Appointments Clause.180 
First, what is a recess of the Senate for purposes of this clause? Second, does the 
Clause apply only to vacancies that arise during the recess? Third, is there a 
durational requirement for Senate recesses that must be satisfied before the Clause 
applies? Noel Canning was a case of first impression for the Court, which had not 
been previously presented with a question under the Recess Appointments Clause.181 
The Court addressed the question of whether the Clause applied only to Senate 
recesses between sessions, or whether the Clause also applied to recesses within 
                                                           
 172 When we recognize the constitutive role of inference, the giving and contesting of 
reasons and arguments for outcomes, in our Constitution, weaknesses in that process, 
including a failure to acknowledge and address opposing arguments can be recognized as a 
fundamental failing. 
 173 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 174 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Tragedy or Triumph, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/opinion/tragedy-or-triumph.html.  
 175 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557-58. 
 176 Id. at 2557. 
 177 Id. at 2575. 
 178 Id. at 2578. 
 179 See id. at 2577 (asserting that Justice Scalia “would basically read [the Recess 
Appointments Clause] out of the Constitution.”). 
 180 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 181 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
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sessions of the Senate.182 As a problem of original understanding, this question faced 
the challenge of distinguishing between intra-session recesses and inter-session 
recesses, as the Senate did not apparently take significant intra-session recesses in 
the first years of the Republic.183 The first intra-session recess appointment the Court 
could find only arose during the Civil War.184 Nevertheless, when the Senate began 
to take significant recesses within its annual sessions, as those sessions became 
lengthier, no distinction appeared to be drawn between inter-session recesses and 
intra-session recesses.185 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, found the ambiguous 
language of the Clause, coupled with the long-standing practice of the executive 
branch, decisive.186 The Court therefore found that the Clause applied to intra-
session recesses as well as inter-session recesses and to vacancies that had arisen 
before the recess.187 Nevertheless, while the historical practice adduced by the Court 
appears well settled (albeit arising long after the Clause was adopted), the Court’s 
textual interpretation appears somewhat forced. It appears forced because of the 
absence of intra-session recesses in the first several decades of the Republic. Justice 
Breyer also made a prudential argument in favor of the conclusion that the Clause 
ought to apply to pre-existing vacancies in order that the work of the federal 
government should proceed.188 
In light of the Court’s determination that the Senate was not in recess when the 
President purported to exercise his power under the Recess Appointments Clause, it 
may not be entirely clear whether the Court’s other conclusions with respect to the 
scope of the Clause stand as precedential holdings or merely as dicta.189 The Court 
styled its finding that the Clause applies with respect to pre-existing vacancies and to 
intra-session recesses holdings.190 As a logical matter once the Court determined that 
Senate was not in recess, the inapplicability of the Recess Appointments Clause 
followed directly. Thus, the determinations as to the other two questions were not 
necessary for the Court’s disposition of the case. On the other hand, if the questions 
before the Court are reordered, then determining whether the Clause applies to pre-
existing vacancies becomes necessary, and such conclusion appears more like a 
holding than like dictum. Holdings and dicta are not necessarily distinguished on the 
basis of limiting holdings to the smallest set of necessary conclusions for decision. A 
recognition of the performative roles of constitutional judicial decisions and opinions 
                                                           
 182 Each house of Congress, including the Senate, is organized into two sessions, each 
corresponding roughly to a calendar year of the two-year term of the Congress. 
 183 Id. at 2561-62 (“[Pre-Civil War history] shows only that Congress generally took long 
breaks between sessions, while taking no significant intra-session breaks at all . . . .”). 
 184 Id. at 2562. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at 2564. 
 187 Id. at 2567. 
 188 Id. at 2568. 
 189 For a contemporary discussion of this distinction—and its practical and theoretical 
limitations, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING 180-84 (2009). 
 190 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567. 
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highlights the distinction between holdings and dicta, which play different 
performative roles. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, 
concurred in the judgment, but argued that the President may fill only vacancies 
arising during a particular Senate recess during that recess under the Recess 
Appointments Clause.191 Justice Scalia argued that the language of the Clause was 
clear and the historical practice was sufficiently uncertain as to offer an insufficient 
basis in any event to override the language of the Clause.192 Justice Scalia began 
with the ordinary “plain meaning” of the language of the Recess Appointments 
Clause.193 He concluded that while in ordinary parlance “to recess” may be 
equivalent to “to adjourn,” in the constitutional context, the use of the definitive 
participle “the” before “recess” in the text confirms a more restrictive use.194 Justice 
Scalia also found support for a restriction of the Clause to vacancies arising during a 
Senate recess in the Pay Act of 1863.195 
Neither the Court’s opinion nor the concurring opinion by Justice Scalia 
acknowledged the uncertainty associated with the results of their respective inquiry 
into the original understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause. Because of the 
tacit interpretative stances adopted, neither fairly considered that the historical 
interpretative question posed might simply not have an answer. As has been often 
pointed out, the ontological commitments of originalism commit it to the belief in 
the existence of historical facts.196 That is a belief that is not shared with professional 
historians.197 Professional historians recognize that the available historical evidence 
may not permit us to answer all questions that may be posed about the past and that 
the risk that the evidence is inadequate or unavailable is increased when questions 
are imposed rather than chosen—as occurs in constitutional disputes. Had the 
Justices been willing to acknowledge that possibility, both the Court’s opinion and 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion might have welcomed additional forms of 
argument to help resolve the questions at hand. 
                                                           
 191 Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 192 These are independent arguments for Justice Scalia, either of which is sufficient to reach 
the conclusion he defends. 
 193 Id. at 2595 (“A sensible interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause should start 
by recognizing that the Clause uses the term ‘Recess’ in contradistinction to the term 
‘Session.’”). 
 194 Id. at 2596. 
 195 Id. at 2613-14. 
 196 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 45. 
 197 See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal 
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997) (writing long after Wofford and Kelly, Kalman 
concludes that the Court had continued to write bad legal history, overstating its conclusions 
and presuming that the questions it faces have historical answers); Suzanna Sherry, The 
Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437 (1996); Alfred H. 
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 147-49 (1965) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of history is not strong as measured by the standards of 
professional historiography); John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964). 
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Imagine the Noel Canning opinions in a post-originalism debate world, with all 
of the modes of argument available. Doctrinal argument would appear of limited 
importance because of the novelty of the question presented.198 Historical, textual, 
structural, and prudential modes of argument would likely be fruitful.199 The 
historical arguments available in Noel Canning are a little unusual, because the 
history effectively begins almost a century into the existence of the provision. But 
that later history, as the Court notes, shows a consistent pattern of recess 
appointments, during intra-session recesses as well as inter-session recesses, and 
extending to both existing vacancies and new vacancies arising during the recess.200 
What does that historical practice show about how the case ought to be decided, if 
anything? Justice Scalia discounts any serious implication in favor of holding that 
such established practice is permitted.201 But he does so, at least in part, because 
such practice arose so long after the original adoption of the Recess Appointments 
Clause in 1789.202 
Noel Canning is a good example of the improvements that we can make to our 
constitutional decision-making if, after moving past the debate over originalism, we 
are freed of the tyranny of finding or constructing answers to our constitutional 
questions in particular modes of argument. Justice Scalia’s historical argument has a 
necessarily forced character, as does Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court. Reading 
the two opinions together, it appears clear that the historical evidence for the 
interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause is hardly unambiguous. Important 
evidence can easily be adduced for very different historical understandings. While 
the Court has to decide the case (or decline to decide the case, leaving a lower court 
decision in place), it does not need to confine itself to a single mode of argument, 
and certain modes, in certain cases, may be more relevant or decisive. 
The structural arguments would appear important in Noel Canning, because Noel 
Canning raises important questions about the relationship of the executive and 
legislative branches and, to a lesser extent, their relationship with the judicial branch. 
The Recess Appointments Clause gives the President a potentially controversial 
means to appoint the senior staff necessary to run the federal government. As the 
Court makes clear in Noel Canning, that power has been used extensively for many 
decades by many Presidents.203 Removing that authority from the President would 
                                                           
 198 Noel Canning thus provides a sharp contrast with Jones and NFIB, which presented 
questions arising in doctrinally well-developed areas of the law (the Fourth Amendment and 
the Commerce Clause, respectively). It might be, of course, that there is analogous doctrine 
that ought to be deployed in answering the questions presented in Noel Canning, but without 
ruling that possibility out, I cannot explore it here. 
 199 Ethical arguments would not appear implicated by the questions in Noel Canning 
because the issues of separation of power and the allocation of authority between the 
executive and legislative branches do not implicate the fundamental character of the Republic 
or the relationship between the state and the individual. 
 200 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2589 app. B (listing the recess appointments made). 
 201 See id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring) (pejoratively characterizing the Court’s opinion 
as adopting an “adverse-possession theory of executive authority”). 
 202 Id. at 2601 (emphasizing that the first intra-session recess appointment did not occur 
until 1867 or 1868). 
 203 Id. at 2564 (majority opinion). 
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have a potentially significant impact on the balance of power between the executive 
and legislative branches.204 Recognizing that authority would have a similar impact, 
albeit in the form of respecting the current status quo. But Justice Scalia is right that 
a decision by the Court also implicates separation of power issues.205 It is not 
immediately apparent how structural arguments ought to bear on the questions 
presented in Noel Canning. How ought the power of the President be balanced 
against the responsibility of the Senate to confirm presidential appointments? When 
we pose that question we must acknowledge the pervasive concerns about the 
current confirmation process.206 These structural arguments and their associated 
concerns ought to be addressed expressly by examining the structural arguments 
available for the various positions. 
Prudential arguments would also appear potentially important in Noel Canning. 
The ability to make executive branch appointments goes to the heart of the ability of 
the President to discharge her responsibilities to execute the law. Unfortunately, that 
abstract statement of principle does not capture the balance struck in the 
constitutional text that requires judges and certain other presidential appointments to 
be confirmed by the Senate. Standing alone, prudential concerns prove too much, 
suggesting that Senate confirmation is inconsistent with the ability of the President 
to act most effectively. To be persuasive, a prudential argument must be cast in a 
manner that respects the balance incorporated into the Constitution’s requirement of 
senatorial confirmation of certain appointments. Yet prudential arguments should be 
part of the separation of powers jurisprudence because we properly ought to take into 
account concerns about the effectiveness of the federal government. Just as the 
Constitution is not a suicide pact, neither ought it gratuitously throw sand in the 
gears of government. In any case, prudential arguments as well as structural 
arguments ought to be considered with respect to the questions presented in Noel 
Canning, recognizing that such arguments stand pari passu with the historical, 
textual, and prudential arguments. 
These three decisions were chosen because of their stature, not because of any 
particular importance within the debate over originalism or particular reliance upon 
originalist or anti-originalist arguments. They are representative of hard, 
controversial cases that reach the Court. They nevertheless present three examples of 
how our constitutional decision practice could be improved if we dispensed with the 
decisional theories underlying the debate over originalism. 
In Jones, the Court wrestled with the constitutional implications of a new 
technology. Only Justice Sotomayor incorporated into her constitutional analysis any 
significant analysis of the nature of the new technology.207 She found the new 
                                                           
 204 Indeed, to the extent that the Senate is now customarily in session before a President is 
inaugurated, an application of the Recess Appointments Clause to vacancies arising only 
during a Senate recess could prevent a newly inaugurated President from filling his cabinet, 
although there might be political reasons why the Senate would not fail to confirm such 
appointments. 
 205 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2593-94 (Scalia, J., concurring). How the Court decided 
Noel Canning had important implications for the balance of power between the President and 
the Senate with respect to filling senior positions within the executive branch. 
 206 See Kagan, supra note 37. Those worries have not diminished since Justice Kagan 
expressed concerns about the process. 
 207 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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technology to pose particularly new challenges to the protections provided by the 
Fourth Amendment.208 Justices Scalia and Alito found themselves side-tracked into a 
formalistic exchange about how the original understandings, expectations, and 
intentions would have treated the installation of a GPS tracker by the police.209 
Ironically, there may have been insights to be garnered from the original 
understandings and expectations. For example, it might be that the original 
understanding and expectation of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment 
would indicate that surveillance in the public sphere was outside the scope of the 
warrant requirement. Or it might be that the Founders attached little import in this 
context to the difference between the private and public spheres. In that event, absent 
the trespass that Justice Scalia focused upon in his analysis, there would not be 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. So to criticize the originalist arguments 
made is not to foreclose other more relevant originalist arguments.210 For example, 
an important argument that could have been made with respect to the text and 
historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment relates to the general 
understanding of the relationship between the people and the state. An argument 
might be made, on terms similar to that invoked by Chief Justice Robert in NFIB, 
that a world that permits warrantless searches like that in Jones “is not the country 
that the Framers of our Constitution envisioned.”211 Explaining why and how, in a 
manner that goes beyond the passing invocation of the Framers by Chief Justice 
Roberts, would have been a valuable argument to have had fully presented in Jones. 
None of those arguments or the reasons to reject the other arguments proffered in 
defense of the opposing readings of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
were adequately or directly explored by the Court or by the concurring opinions. 
In NFIB, the Court broke important new ground with respect to the Commerce 
Clause and with respect to federalism. Those steps warranted a more direct analysis 
of the new constraints imposed upon the federal spending power than the Court or 
Justice Scalia’s dissent provide. How those constraints were to be reconciled with 
the prior precedent that appears to provide no such limit warrants a fuller analysis. 
The facile invocation of the novel concept of coercion applied by one sovereign to 
another sovereign appears insufficient for that task.212 The decision in NFIB also 
invites an exploration of the limits imposed upon the Commerce Clause and the 
critical role played in the analysis of the purported distinction between an act and a 
                                                           
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion); id. at 959 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 210 Part of my criticism here is grounded on the suspicion that the argumentative strategy 
that Justice Scalia adopts is generated by his methodological goal of establishing an originalist 
jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. See Antonin Scalia, Foreword, in ORIGINALISM: A 
QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 43-44 (Steven C. Calabresi ed., 2007); see also SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 14. By constructing an analysis of the Fourth Amendment that 
relied only upon trespass, Justice Scalia sought in his opinion to construct a Fourth 
Amendment theory that could potentially limit the doctrinal development arising from Katz 
that focused on expectations of privacy—not a doctrine easily reconciled with an originalist 
stance. See TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 238. 
 211 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012). 
 212 Id. at 2604 (characterizing the potential loss of federal funding by the states as “a gun to 
the head”). 
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failure to act.213 The Court (and the opinion by Justice Scalia and three of his 
colleagues) emphasizes that distinction, and relies heavily on it in holding that the 
Affordable Care Act exceeded the federal government’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause.214 It is an intuitive distinction—freighted, however, with tacit 
philosophical assumptions of action theory—that are far less compelling than the 
Court assumed. Without them, the bright line that the Court sought to draw appears 
problematic.  
Finally, in Noel Canning the Court confronted an important question of 
separation of powers and of the division of authority and power among the branches 
of the federal government.215 Like Jones and NFIB, it produced multiple opinions 
and intense controversy within the Court. As in those cases, too, the quality of the 
argument within the split opinions of the Court would have been enhanced as to their 
substance and persuasive force if those opinions had not been written within the 
context of the ongoing debate over originalism. The “gravitational effect” that 
Barnett asserts exists for originalism216 also exists for the originalism debate. Indeed, 
the effect is sufficiently great that it is perhaps not unlike a black hole. 
Critics may note that I have offered little in the way of a substantive criticism of 
the decision of any of these three cases or, indeed, of the alternative decisions that 
the concurring and dissenting opinions would have reached. Does it follow that a 
post-debate constitutional practice leaves everything as it is, much as Wittgenstein 
asserted philosophy does?217 If so, then what is the significance of leaving the 
originalism debate behind? While I have eschewed engaging substantively in making 
a judgment as to the argument or decision of these three cases, I have done so to 
avoid obscuring the fundamental claim here that a constitutional practice that 
proceeds with the benefit of all of these modes of argument, rather than rejecting 
some proper subset of them on methodological or theoretical grounds, gives a richer 
and more powerful Constitution. There will often or always be disagreements about 
how those various arguments should be made and, ultimately, a judgment about their 
respective force. But that practice will not leave everything as it is. We can have a 
stronger and more robust practice of constitutional argument and decision-making if 
we abandon the debate about originalism together with its underlying tacit premises 
and assumptions. The debate over originalism is part of the problem, not part of the 
solution. 
C. New Directions in the Academy 
We may anticipate similarly positive implications for the practice of 
constitutional theory in the academy if we can transcend the originalism debate. We 
may return to the doctrinal and other questions raised by the adjudication of 
                                                           
 213 Id. at 2587. 
 214 See id. at 2587-91; id. at 2649 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 215 I use the preposition among because in addition to raising the question of the scope of 
the Recess Appointments Clause, the case also required a determination of how the Court 
would approach such a dispute implicating the division of power between the legislative and 
executive branches. 
 216 See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 217 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 49, at § 124. 
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constitutional questions under our American Constitution. That is an opportunity that 
has been compromised by the ongoing debate over originalism.   
Dramatic evidence of the costs imposed by the debate over originalism came 
about a decade ago when Laurence Tribe announced that he could not complete the 
third edition of his renowned constitutional law treatise.218 He did not expressly 
attribute the source of his inability to the debate over originalism or even to 
originalism itself. The principal reason Tribe stated for his decision was that there no 
longer was a discernible deep structure to American constitutional law.219 Tribe 
suggests that the level or degree of flux is such that even a gifted theorist and 
constitutional visionary like himself220 could, in Hegelian terms not generally 
expressly part of his constitutional commentary221 or his treatise,222 mistake a mere 
thesis for a synthesis.223 With an attempt to identify the deep structure of our 
constitutional law “utter hubris were it not so manifestly quixotic.”224 Unwilling to 
prepare a mere “serviceable hornbook-like treatment,” Tribe has conceded authorial 
defeat.225 
Professor Tribe’s conclusion warrants note, both for its force, and because of the 
source, of course. If and to the extent that it were true, Tribe's verdict would appear 
to preclude his project of conceptual constitutional doctrinal analysis. To the extent 
that Tribe's judgment is right, what are its implications for the originalism debate? 
To what extent does that conclusion arise out of the originalism debate and its tacit 
premises? First, and most obviously, Tribe’s account suggests that the debate over 
originalism reflects fundamental disagreements over the nature of the Constitution, 
constitutional interpretation, and constitutional adjudication. Conceptualizing Bork 
                                                           
 218 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 291 (2005) [hereinafter 
Tribe, Treatise Power]. For a representative assessment of that work, see LEVINSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 50, at 40. 
 219 Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 295-96. The general decline in treatise writing 
by law professors has been frequently remarked, and Tribe’s decision may initially appear just 
another instance of this more general development. 
 220 Id. at 295 (“I do not have, nor do I believe I have seen, a vision capacious and 
convincing enough to propound as an organizing principle for the next phase in the law of our 
Constitution.”). 
 221 See, e.g., TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 13; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES (1985). 
 222 While Tribe organizes his treatise by references to models of the Constitution that were 
dominant in different periods, he never suggests that the transition from one model to the next 
was best understood in Hegelian evolutionary terms. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. 
 223 Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 296 (“what once looked like a synthesis 
becomes at best a new thesis”). Certainly there are Hegelian elements to Tribe’s constitutional 
narrative. It could be read as describing, through the alternative models that Tribe identifies 
and articulates, the historical evolution of the constitutional world spirit along the lines of 
Hegel’s own Phenomenology. See generally HEGEL, supra note 6. 
 224 Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 296. It would take a more sophisticated 
student of Greek tragedy than I to be assured that hubris cannot be quixotic. 
 225 The second volume of the third edition of Tribe’s American Constitutional Law has 
indeed never yet appeared. 
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or Justice Scalia’s Constitution would not appear a difficult task for Tribe.226 
Similarly, the critics of originalism do not appear to articulate or commit to a 
constitutional interpretation that Tribe could not conceptualize.227 Thus, it may 
appear that Tribe is tacitly suggesting that the debate over originalism is embedded 
in our constitutional doctrine and decisions, contributing to the absence of a coherent 
deep structure for current American constitutional law. That is not what Tribe 
intends, however, because he is one of originalism's most vigorous critics, and 
attributes few if any explanatory virtues to it.228 The absence of a deep structure in 
contemporary constitutional doctrine may appear simply to be Tribe's restatement of 
a Borkian claim: that there is no consensus among those who argue against 
originalism as to the alternative.229 That is not what Tribe intends, however, because 
he is committed to the position that there are answers to questions of constitutional 
interpretation.230 
The disarray in the conceptualization of American constitutional law may 
demonstrate that we are at a particularly creative stage in our nation’s constitutional 
evolution.231 It is plausible that doctrinal complexity and disarray accompanies 
shifting paradigms in our constitutional narrative and theory.232 That is not the 
implication Tribe intends, because the import of his observation is that the 
development of our constitutional doctrine has reached an impasse.233 Alternatively, 
Tribe's judgment may demonstrate, as Farber and Sherry suggest, that the academy 
has been distracted by constitutional high theory to the detriment of efforts toward 
working through less abstract doctrinal questions.234 The absence of meaningful 
                                                           
 226 See generally TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 46. 
 227 Indeed, Tribe offers a fairly succinct statement of his understanding of Dworkin’s 
Constitution—and his own reasons for rejecting that constitutional theory. See Tribe, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 73, at 72; see also TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 46, at 17-
18 (rejecting Dworkin’s methodology of constitutional interpretation as too open ended and 
unconstrained by law). 
 228 See generally Tribe, INTERPRETATION, supra note 73. 
 229 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, at 251-59. 
 230 TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 46, at 18-19 (distinguishing the methods of proof 
for propositions of constitutional law from those for propositions of mathematics). 
 231 The possibility that we are at a moment of marked constitutional discontinuity, akin to 
one of the earlier constitutional revolutions, would be equally unattractive to most originalists 
as well as their critics. For the originalists, the possibility of a radical break with the historic 
Constitution would be unpalatable, except for the boldest among them. For their critics, the 
specter of the originalists’ constitutional theory becoming the new orthodoxy is substantively 
unattractive. 
 232 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) 
(defending a now classic but still controversial account of fundamental changes in scientific 
theories incorporating the concepts of paradigms and paradigm shifts that cannot be explained 
simply on the basis of empirical evidence or experimental results). 
 233 See Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 295. 
 234 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 165-66 (2002) [hereinafter FARBER & 
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING]. In fairness, it should be acknowledged that Tribe is not 
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attention to much of the work in the legal academy from the judiciary (or from 
practicing lawyers making arguments in court) may be evidence for Farber and 
Sherry's claim.235 Thus, Tribe has been able to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice. But the goal of theory making is express, and Tribe's judgment reflects a 
pessimism as to its current possibility. 
Without the constraints of the ongoing debate over originalism we may return to 
the substantive constitutional problems of democracy, limits on democratic choice, 
executive power, delegation of power, freedom of speech, equal protection, 
federalism, and the limits of federal power. Many of these questions are doctrinal; 
but others may implicate structural or prudential arguments and concerns. For 
example, one of Jack Balkin's most interesting substantive constitutional arguments 
is against the long-standing doctrine narrowly interpreting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.236 Balkin challenges that existing doctrine not only on the basis 
that it has effectively eviscerated the rights protected under that Clause237 but also on 
the basis that a broader construction is a better construction of the original text.238 
Charles Fried complements his account of the importance of doctrine with an 
argument for the importance of judgment.239 The substantive claims Balkin and 
Fried make deserve our attention more than the effectively methodological debate 
over originalism. They deserve our attention because they do not generate empty 
debates grounded on tacit confusions and untenable stances. They deserve our 
attention because of their importance to the Republic and to its citizens. 
Two examples from contemporary constitutional scholarship show how our 
constitutional argument and discourse might be enriched if we move beyond the 
debate over originalism. These scholars’ works stand as examples of what may be 
accomplished in a post-originalism debate world, even though both of these scholars 
have joined that debate.240 Moreover, neither would likely subscribe to the account I 
                                                           
among the examples of excessively conceptual constitutional theorists cited by Farber and 
Sherry. 
 235 See id. at 160-68. 
 236 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 190-219. Balkin is not, of course, 
the first to argue that the Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence went badly awry 
beginning in the Slaughter House Cases. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 22-30 (1980) [hereinafter, ELY, DEMOCRACY]. But 
Balkin develops that argument programmatically as part of a project to revivify a Privileges or 
Immunities Clause jurisprudence. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 190-
219. Indeed, Balkin would find the right to bear arms within the scope of the Clause and, in 
one of the most celebrated or notorious uses of the Clause, Balkin would protect a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion within the ambit of the rights protected thereunder. Id. at 
214-19; Balkin, Abortion, supra note 22. Kurt Lash takes a more modest view of the scope of 
the Clause. See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS (2014). 
 237 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 18, at 190-91. 
 238 See id. at 208-12. 
 239 See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 184-200 (2004) [hereinafter FRIED, SAYING]; see also Fried, Judgment, supra note 58. 
 240 See, e.g., Fried, Judgment, supra note 58; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 6; Cass R. 
Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. REV. 205 (1991). 
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am offering here.241 But self-consciousness is not always a necessary predicate for 
action.242 Moreover, in selecting these two examples, I do not endorse the analysis 
they propound, but only offer them as examples of an alternative to participation in 
the largely methodological debate over originalism.243 Nor are these examples 
consistent among themselves; Posner's pragmatism and Fried's conservative 
emphasis on doctrine and judgment are competing modes of analysis and argument. 
That is a source of strength, not weakness, because our constitutional law largely 
reflects historical and ongoing tensions, disagreements, and arguments about the 
relationship of the federal government to the states, the separation of powers, and the 
relationship of the citizen to the state, among others. Those arguments and the 
resolution of those arguments constitute our constitutional law. That sometimes the 
unsettled nature of our constitutional law ought to be reflected in our understanding 
of that law (and the defense of propositions of that law) as clearly as is the currently 
settled elements of our law.244 
1. Richard Posner and the National Security Constitution 
The challenges we face as a people, as a society, and as a state are radically 
different, from those faced on adoption of the Constitution or the ratification of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. Our constitutional law needs to engage in defining the 
role of the executive in the modern state of security, non-state military and terrorist 
threats, and easily portable weapons of mass destruction. To the extent that our 
thinking about national security remains trapped in the eighteenth century, and 
endeavor to answer our modern questions on that template, we may not necessarily 
be unable to do so, but we make our task far harder and put a premium on artificial 
and scholastic reasoning. One work that highlights both the need of our 
constitutional theory to engage the great questions of our generation and the 
difficulties in carrying out such an exercise with only the tools of original 
understanding jurisprudence is John Yoo’s The Powers of War and Peace.245 
Yoo has thought long and hard, both in the academy and in the Justice 
Department as the author of the now rightly condemned “waterboard opinion, about 
                                                           
 241 Judge Posner would not agree with my strategy because he is committed to a prudential 
mode of argument and addresses other modes of argument somewhat grudgingly, recognizing 
the attraction they have for others. Fried would not likely endorse the use to which I put his 
analysis because he has never expressly committed to a pluralist account of constitutional 
argument let alone to the kinds of anti-foundational arguments I have presented and because 
of his endorsement of many of Dworkin’s claims that I would reject. 
 242 From Kierkegaard to Freud to Sartre a host of modern explorations of the ways in which 
we proceed to act and to otherwise lead our lives simply without self-awareness or even on the 
basis of self-deception abound. 
 243 I have selected these examples in part because I am not entirely in agreement with their 
substantive views, but they are nevertheless good examples of approaches that break free from 
the debate over originalism. Of course, many of these authors have also participated in that 
debate, too. 
 244 But since Hegel we have understood that self-consciousness with respect to action 
changes the nature of the act and the actor, and self-consciousness is an important part of our 
constitutional argument and practice. 
 245 YOO, supra note 34 (defending a broad array of presidential powers under an expansive 
reading of the War Powers Clause and the concept of the unitary executive). 
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the needs of our Republic in addressing the threat it faces from terrorists.”246 His 
originalist approach to this problem requires him to address the immediate, sweaty 
questions of how we may and should respond, constitutionally, to this crisis by 
looking to the political and constitutional thought of the eighteenth century. Al 
Qaeda is not the Barbary pirates, and we should not confuse the two, or approach our 
constitutional choices as if we are trapped in the world of the Barbary pirates.247 
Nevertheless, Yoo endeavors to answer the relevant questions concerning executive 
power, not with respect to the constitutional law that we have, but solely by looking 
to a reconstruction of the original understanding of the original Constitution.248 His 
work is a tour de force,249 but in light of the very different conclusions about the 
original understanding that other careful scholars like John Ely have come to,250 it is 
hard not to remain at best unsatisfied by his analysis. It seems artificial (because the 
national security concerns we face today are so different from those of the late 
eighteenth century) and so uncertain (because any purported answers rely upon such 
attenuated evidence and face the challenge of anachronicity).251 
Yoo’s analysis and prescriptions may be compared with those offered by Judge 
Posner.252 Judge Posner rejects originalism as a pragmatist.253 Accordingly, his 
approach to many of the same pressing, practical questions that Yoo addresses is 
very different. Judge Posner can bring an array of tools and techniques to his 
problem precisely because of the instrumentalist conception of law. His approach to 
the problems of combating terrorism within the limits imposed by the Constitution 
seems almost designed to mock the originalists. Thus he begins with a claim about 
the source of constitutional rights: 
                                                           
 246 See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 34 (analyzing the legal arguments surrounding 
permissible interrogation techniques, but also acknowledging the place of moral luck). 
 247 The motivation of al-Qaeda is different, the tools available to it are very different, and 
its relationship to any sovereign is different than those of the Barbary pirates. Those 
fundamental differences arise from a variety of sources, including technological, social, 
religious, and political change. 
 248 Yoo is express in relying upon the original understandings with respect to the provisions 
of the Constitution, and like so many originalists and their critics, he suggests that such 
reliance upon the original understanding secures legitimacy and avoids interpretative 
problems presented by other forms of originalism. YOO, supra note 34, at 27-28. 
 249 Thus, for example, Yoo seeks to distinguish the power to declare war from the power to 
make war. The latter he attributes to the President; the former to Congress. Missing, of course, 
is any indication why the seemingly far less important power should be expressly provided 
for, and the far more important power to make war simply attributed to the executive branch 
by implication. Moreover, as Judge Posner nicely remarks, Yoo appears committed to the 
reversal of Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), as that exercise of 
presidential power would also seem to fall within the scope of his argument, although Yoo 
does not acknowledge this issue. See POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34. 
 250 See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
AND ITS AFTERMATH 3, 139 n.4 (1993). 
 251 See generally LeDuc, What Were They Thinking?, supra note 39, at section II.A.3. 
 252 See POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34. 
 253 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26-29 (1990) [hereinafter 
POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE]. 
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It is natural to think that constitutional rights are rights stated in the text of 
the Constitution of the United States. But it is wrong, not completely but 
in an important sense. Constitutional rights are created mainly by the 
Supreme Court of the United States by “interpretation” of the 
constitutional text.254 
Thus, Judge Posner has stated a variety of controversial claims: (1) that 
originalism is mistaken, (2) that interpretation is a misleading or overly restrictive 
concept within which to cabin constitutional adjudication, and (3) that constitutional 
precedent, howsoever properly defined, is a source of authoritative constitutional 
rights and law.255 All of this is consistent with the views he has articulated in his 
jurisprudential writings.256 Moreover, Judge Posner employs the broad-ranging 
methods that he has endorsed as a legal pragmatist. While Judge Posner is prepared 
to make technical and doctrinal arguments,257 he is equally prepared to ground those 
arguments on a very practical approach to what works and what does not258 based 
upon his own assessment of the nature of the threat that the Republic faces.259 
The result is not easy to score on basis of whether or not the analysis yields a 
result more liberal or more conservative, more solicitous of civil rights and civil 
liberties, or more attentive to the needs of national security. There are certainly gaps 
in some of Judge Posner’s analysis. Few are likely to be any more persuaded by his 
glossing over Korematsu than of an analysis of equal protection that left readers 
uncertain as to the legitimacy of Plessy v. Ferguson. Judge Posner is not long 
delayed looking for the answers in the eighteenth-century Constitution to the 
constitutional questions regarding national security that we face at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century. 
Stripped of its stylistic excesses,260 Judge Posner’s analysis makes a valuable 
contribution to the analysis of the constitutional and legislative issues that we face 
                                                           
 254 POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 17. 
 255 Id. Ironically, in this initial laying down of markers we see Posner trapped in his 
traditional representational epistemology, despite his purported mastery of the modern texts. 
Thus, he assumes that there is a meaningful contrast to be drawn between being in the text and 
being understood to be in the text through our practices of constitutional law. Like Achilles 
(and like Hercules) he imagines that the constitutional text can grab us by the throat and make 
us acknowledge the truth of statements about constitutional law. See Lewis Carroll, What the 
Tortoise Said to Achilles, 4 MIND 278 (1895) (classical demonstration of the limits of logic). 
Judge Posner has picked a fight not only that he cannot win and that needlessly distracts us 
from the otherwise insightful analysis he has on offer, but does so on a phantom playing field. 
See id. 
 256 See generally POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 253. 
 257 See POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 3-4 (noting the limited scope of the Posse 
Comitatus act, and its inapplicability in certain cases of emergency). 
 258 See id. at 147. 
 259 One cannot but be reminded of Dworkin’s earlier assessment of another of Judge 
Posner’s works. “Judge Posner’s book is characteristic of that phenomenally prolific author’s 
virtues and defects. It is clear, erudite, punchy, knock-about, witty, and relentlessly 
superficial.” RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 266 n.11 (2006). 
 260 For example, when Judge Posner betrays his commitment to his law and economic roots 
and refers to the President “buying” the power to violate the Constitution by expending 
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today with respect to national security. His methodology appears far more persuasive 
and, indeed, politically viable than a method that confines its analysis to the views or 
understandings of the Founders or Ratifiers. That limited conclusion is not to assert 
that such a prudential analysis would always be more persuasive with respect to 
constitutional decision-making, or even that it would always be more persuasive 
with respect to current constitutional questions implicating national security.261 Nor 
is it to assert that there is a meaning of the Constitution that Judge Posner has 
correctly determined as to which there is a fact of the matter, and which would be 
inconsistent with an originalist interpretation, argument, or decision.262 
Judge Posner’s approach in Not a Suicide Pact is possible because it is not 
seriously constrained by the jurisprudential arguments he has advanced in the 
originalism debate. While much of the argument (following the implicature of the 
work’s title) emphasizes pragmatic considerations,263 Judge Posner is also sensitive 
to doctrinal264 and even, at least to some degree, ethical265 issues that are raised by 
the new national security challenges that the Republic faces. For example, in 
defending an argument that very harsh methods should be available to elicit or 
extract information from terrorists, Judge Posner acknowledges the force of the 
public resistance to the use of torture by the state.266 He engages that argument and 
offers a set of arguments that are designed to respond to the counterarguments from 
those who would strike down some of the more aggressive techniques he defends on 
the grounds that they violate the Eighth Amendment.267 We do not have to agree 
with Judge Posner’s position or be persuaded by his arguments (or even to believe 
that his unsubstantiated empirical claim that torture is sometimes helpful)268 to 
acknowledge that Judge Posner recognizes and respects the various modes of 
argument deployed in this constitutional context.  
Judge Posner’s approach is, above all, to an American constitution. He is 
generally cognizant and respectful of the historical context and practice within which 
                                                           
political capital; this metaphor is unlikely to illuminate the analysis or to resonate with many 
of us. POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 154-55. But I also have in mind the 
proliferation of florid adverbs, adjectives, and normative nouns. 
 261 Indeed, inherent in Judge Posner's prudential analysis is the notion that it may apply 
most forcefully only in certain limited circumstances. See id. at 12-13. 
 262 Posner always appears content to make his arguments, however forcefully and self-
assuredly, in the context of an ongoing argument and discourse with other participants. See id. 
 263 See id. at 27 (emphasizing the value of legal pragmatism). 
 264 See id. at 17 (noting that constitutional rights arise, in an important sense, not directly 
out of the constitutional text, but out of Supreme Court decisions in the course of 
constitutional interpretation). 
 265 See id. at 78-84 (discussing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which held that 
the police could not pump the stomach of a suspect without obtaining a warrant, and the 
definition of torture). 
 266 Id. at 82-83. 
 267 Id. at 82-87. 
 268 The most recent, publicly available assessment of the benefit of torture suggests 
otherwise. See generally S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014) (Conf. Rep.). 
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constitutional adjudication occurs.269 While it may be tempting to dismiss Judge 
Posner as simply articulating a prudential reading of the Constitution with respect to 
national security issues, to employ Bobbitt’s modalities, that reductive 
characterization may be somewhat misleading. Judge Posner’s focus, while 
prudential, offers persuasive (if not necessarily determinative) arguments for that 
approach with respect to his subject. That is an important and valuable contribution. 
Moreover, it is not clear that Judge Posner is committed to the proposition that his 
approach to constitutional questions arising with respect to national security 
demonstrates the superiority or exclusivity of prudential arguments in general.270 
Rather, a prudential analysis appears particularly powerful in the national security 
context. Indeed, in the context of the right to carry arms guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment, for example, Judge Posner has been indifferent to prudential 
argument.271 
2. Charles Fried, Doctrine, and Judgment 
Charles Fried has generally tempered his criticism of originalism,272 but has 
remained one of the few conservative constitutional scholars to have continued to 
insist on a more complex canon of constitutional interpretation than originalism 
offers.273 Fried’s constitutional theory is also richer than that of many of its critics. 
Fried’s account of the Constitution and constitutional reasoning is proudly 
conservative; his constitutional theory and analysis is comfortably within a Burkean 
intellectual tradition that expressly values the accomplishments of the past. 
Fried’s response to the problem of the Warren Court—as well, less expressly, as 
that of originalism—has two elements. First, he seeks to remind us of the importance 
                                                           
 269 In this respect Judge Posner's scholarship sometimes departs from the good sense of his 
decision-making. Thus, for example, when Judge Posner discusses Korematsu, it is not clear 
that he would reject the approach upheld in that case except to the extent that constitutional 
doctrine has evolved inconsistently with it. See POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 116-
17. 
 270 Of course, as a founder of the law and economics movement and a fervent utilitarian, 
Judge Posner gives less weight to ethical argument. See Richard Posner, The Problematics of 
Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1998). 
 271 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding a state statute 
prohibiting individuals from carrying guns in public unconstitutional and disregarding the 
costs associated with that conclusion). Judge Posner may have understood his decision to be 
governed by precedent and therefore prudential arguments that had been earlier unpersuasive 
ought not to be adduced as determinative. See id. at 939-49. 
 272 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION —A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 61-65 (1992) [hereinafter FRIED, ARGUING]. But see Fried, Judgment, 
supra note 58 (criticizing the mechanical nature of Justice Scalia’s originalist style of 
decision). 
 273 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 184-200; see also Charles Fried, Constitutional 
Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter Fried, Doctrine] (describing the 
temporality of our existence, and its importance for constitutional doctrine); see also FRIED, 
ARGUING, supra note 272. There is a little irony in characterizing Fried as defending a 
conservative Constitution because he denies that constitutional doctrine can be reduced to, or 
mapped onto traditional political perspectives. FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 241-42. 
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and complexity of constitutional doctrine.274 That complexity plays at least three 
roles in Fried’s account of constitutional law. The complexity of our constitutional 
law demonstrates that there are constitutional authorities beyond the austere text of 
the Constitution.275 Fried does not spend much time articulating the ontological 
nature of that edifice.276 He does, however, sketch out the notion that the temporal 
extension of constitutional doctrine is grounded in our own temporal nature.277 That 
is, put somewhat simplistically, we require a continuity in the narrative of our 
constitutional doctrine in the same way we construct and live a continuous, coherent 
narrative of our own selves.278 For Fried, the continuity of our constitutional doctrine 
is demanded for the same reasons that we insist upon continuity and coherence in 
our own life choices.279 
An initial ontological question is whether Fried’s emphasis upon, and claims for, 
doctrine can be reconciled with Bobbitt’s account of the practice of constitutional 
argument. Put another way, is Fried ontologically committed to the status of 
constitutional doctrine independent of our practice? Or can that articulation of 
constitutional doctrine be recharacterized as describing the kinds of doctrinal 
arguments that are proper within our constitutional practices? Fried’s articulation of 
doctrine is not inconsistent with Bobbitt’s ontology; Bobbitt includes doctrinal 
argument as one of the six modes of constitutional argument.280 While Fried 
emphasizes the importance of doctrine, he nowhere claims exclusivity or priority for 
doctrine.281 Fried’s focus on constitutional doctrine does not entail that such doctrine 
be accorded an independent ontological status. We can talk about such doctrine and 
debate its claims and its strengths and its weaknesses without attributing such status 
to it. 
Nevertheless, because of Fried’s endorsement of a variety of Dworkin’s views,282 
it may be questioned whether Bobbitt’s account can be thus reconciled with Fried’s 
                                                           
 274 See generally Fried, Doctrine, supra note 273. 
 275 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 3.  
 276 See Fried, Doctrine, supra note 273, at 1140-41. 
 277 Id. at 1144 ("The solution to the paradox [of reconciling the demands of reason with the 
requirement of action] at every level begins by noticing that we are time-extended, not 
punctual, beings."). Here Fried is identifying the need to construct a narrative of our life and 
of our aspirations, and to account for how our choices have unfolded, with our successes and 
our failures. 
 278 Id. at 1144-47. 
 279 Id. at 1144-48 (describing doctrine as exemplifying constitutive reason, rather than 
instrumental reason). 
 280 BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6, at 39-58. 
 281 Indeed, to the extent that Fried's account of constitutional doctrine is accompanied by an 
account of the importance of judgment, which appears expressly contrasted with historical and 
other techné and linked, in the case of good judgments, with wisdom, Fried's theory would 
appear inconsistent with such a claim of exclusivity, as such a claim would trivialize the 
account of judgment. See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58. 
 282 For example, Fried has characterized Dworkin's work both as instructive and 
foundational to his own. See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 249 n.1; see also Fried, 
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own. Dworkin, after all, apparently would reject Bobbitt’s account, as we have 
explored at some length.283 Dworkin’s rejection of that account is based upon his 
insistence upon the objectivity of values.284 If there is nothing more than our 
constitutional social practices, then there would appear to be no place for Dworkin’s 
objective standard. There is only our inter-subjective practice.285 Put another way, 
Dworkin believes that the truth of propositions of constitutional law arises from the 
correspondence of those propositions with Dworkin’s objective constitutional 
world.286 That world includes value theories that articulate political obligations.287 
Fried would not apparently treat propositions of constitutional law as true by 
correspondence. Such propositions are rather expressions of value or performatives 
that make constitutional choices.288 Nevertheless, his exposition of the nature of 
constitutional doctrine appears to recognize its fundamentally social character, 
ungrounded on objective facts of the world.289 
Second, Fried’s constitutional doctrine, and its obvious inherent complexity, is 
evidence for Fried that constitutional law cannot be reduced to political doctrine, or 
to a series of political choices.290 The doctrine cannot be so reduced because the 
elements that it incorporates, the factors that it enumerates, and the distinctions that 
it draws appear fundamentally removed from ordinary political concepts and values. 
Moreover, traditional measures of political profiles do not adequately capture the 
doctrinal positions of the Supreme Court Justices.291 
Third, Fried relies upon the complexity of constitutional doctrine to help make 
his case for the importance of judgment.292 The complexity of the doctrine he 
                                                           
Doctrine, supra note 273, at 1156-57 (endorsing the aptness of Dworkin's infamous chain 
novel metaphor). 
 283 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 87 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity] (asserting the existence of objective 
standards and the existence and importance of an objective world); see also LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 1. 
 284 See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 283, at 88-89. 
 285 See DONALD DAVIDSON, Three Varieties of Knowledge, in SUBJECTIVE, 
INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 205 (2001) (calling out for attention and analysis the 
relationship of the three forms of our knowledge: objective, subjective, and intersubjective). 
 286 Id.; see also RONALD DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (1977) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, PHILOSOPHY]. 
 287 DWORKIN, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 286. 
 288 See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58, at 1025, 1039-40 (invoking the concept of a 
category mistake in the case of failures to distinguish between the proper role of judicial 
decision and matter of fact). Fried's important point can be restated without either the concepts 
of questions of fact or category mistakes. 
 289 In making this claim, I have in mind Fried’s emphasis on the role of judgment in 
adjudication. See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 6-10 (describing the evolution of judicial 
doctrine). 
 290 See id. at 241-42. 
 291 See TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 4; see also FRIED, SAYING, 
supra note 239, at 241-42. 
 292 See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58. 
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describes, the various arguments that may be constructed from it, and the tacit 
recognition in that doctrine of the varying considerations that are implicated by the 
case at hand, grounds Fried’s claim that a judge tasked with deciding a case must 
often, in the end, make a choice in order to make a decision. But that exercise of 
judgment is necessary, on Fried's account, because of the complexity of the 
questions presented and the competing interests, values, principles, and 
interpretations that must be addressed, as to which no algorithm offers a decidable 
procedure for resolution.293 
More recently, Fried has articulated more fully an account of constitutional law 
that emphasizes the role of judgment in adjudication and more directly criticizes the 
limitations of an originalist approach.294 The place of judgment in our constitutional 
adjudication is receiving greater emphasis in part in contrast to the decisional 
algorithms purportedly endorsed by the originalists.295 While Fried recognizes that 
there are better and worse doctrinal choices, at the bottom Fried’s account calls for 
the judge to make a judgment in the case presented.296 There is not an algorithm, or a 
decision process, that can substitute for that human role, in which a great many 
intangibles factor into the quality of the decision, through what we call judgment. 
Fried agrees with this central tenet of Bobbitt's analysis, without, however, exploring 
the relationship of his account to Bobbitt's.297 Fried understands, as judge, advocate, 
and as professor, the critical298 and perhaps necessary299 role of the intermediation of 
doctrine in the adjudication of constitutional cases. That intermediation is directly 
and fundamentally challenged by originalism in its claim to the exclusive authority 
of the constitutional text.300 It is that rejection of the role of constitutional doctrine—
or at least its devaluation—by originalism that Fried himself rejects.301 
                                                           
 293 See id. 
 294 See id.; see also FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239. 
 295 Justice Scalia, for example, offers an account of constitutional judicial decision-making 
that makes it appear almost mechanistic. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 45 
(characterizing the task of the originalist judge to determine original understandings as being 
“easy to discern and simple to apply”). 
 296 See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58, at 1043-44 (“It is striking that some of Justice 
Scalia's most powerful and convincing opinions do not depend on originalist arguments—
whether of the intent or meaning variety—but are applications and manipulations of, or 
extrapolations from existing precedents, doctrines, or principles.”); see also BOBBITT, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 48, at 166-67 (describing a conversation between Judges Hand 
and Friendly on the necessity, in the end, of making a decision). 
 297 See generally Fried, Judgment, supra note 58. 
 298 See Fried, Doctrine, supra note 273, at 1144, 1148-51. 
 299 Id. Judgment is necessary insofar as it cannot be replaced with another method or 
process. Id. 
 300 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, at 155-56. 
 301 See FRIED, ARGUING, supra note 273, at 61-5. Barnett’s reconciliation of precedent with 
originalism might suggest that Fried was too quick to reject originalism as inconsistent with 
constitutional doctrine. A more sympathetic reading would recognize that Fried is unwilling to 
accept the limits on doctrine that Barnett would apply. While Barnett obviously recognizes a 
more robust role for non-originalist doctrine than does Judge Bork, for example, it would 
appear a much less robust role than Fried is committed to. For Fried, doctrine is the articulated 
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In Saying What the Law Is, Fried explores a series of critical contemporary 
constitutional issues in ways that are always thoughtful and often persuasive. His 
Constitution is perhaps unique, both for its non-originalism,302 its conservative 
approach to economic issues,303 its vision of a limited federal government304 
attentive both to the demands of federalism305 and requirements of the modern 
state,306 and its deep commitment to civil liberties.307 One need not agree with 
Fried’s substantive interpretations to admire the careful, precise, and closely 
reasoned analysis. For example, addressing the permissibility of self-imposed 
affirmative action programs to combat the legacy of racial discrimination, Fried 
argues that the Court would have been well-served to imposed deadlines on the 
continued use of such programs.308 Whether one agrees with that conclusion, it 
reflects a measured approach to the goal that such programs have, the realities that 
give rise to them, and the perils that many see inherent in such affirmative action 
programs. 
Part of what makes Fried’s analysis so engaging and important is precisely his 
commitment to the importance of constitutional doctrine and his articulation of the 
role of judgment. His argument is engaging because his careful and detailed account 
of the development of constitutional doctrine fits the facts. His account of 
judgment—and the associated claims as to recent decisions that exemplify good and 
                                                           
core of the Constitution; while it is not invulnerable to challenge based upon the constitutional 
text or its original understanding, Fried is not willing to concede the priority of the original 
understanding, intentions or expectations. That priority, as shown earlier, is required not only 
under Barnett’s originalism but also more generally. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 57; see 
also FRIED, ARGUING, supra note 272, at 61-5. 
 302 See FRIED, ARGUING, supra note 272, at 61-5. 
 303 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 178-82 (arguing that common-law concepts of 
property interests have properly informed the interpretation of the prohibition on 
uncompensated takings of the Fifth Amendment, which, in its broad language, required 
specification). 
 304 Id. at 58-59 (exploring and tacitly endorsing the limitation of the legislative branch to 
the making of laws and the executive to enforcing the laws, with the limitations thereon 
imposed by Youngstown Sheet & Tube). 
 305 Id. at 32-35 (describing the Court’s modern efforts to articulate the limits of the federal 
government’s power to regulate state and local governments, from the short-lived approach of 
attempting to exempt from regulation of “traditional governmental functions” in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), to the narrower prohibition of 
“commandeering” the machinery of non-federal governments in New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992)). 
 306 FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 55-68 (acknowledging that the tripartite division of 
the federal government under the Constitution is a rough fit with the modern welfare state and 
the growth of powerful independent administrative agencies). 
 307 Id. at 184-200 (concluding that the Court in its contemporary recognition of liberty 
interests “has not gone too far in its protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause. 
Perhaps it has not gone far enough.”). 
 308 Id. at 240. 
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bad judgment—is powerful.309 It is a compelling description of what the cases look 
like because constitutional cases present hard questions that require both attention to 
doctrine and the exercise of judgment.310 
It may not be enough simply to outline the case for the exercise of judgment 
without offering a fuller account of how that faculty operates, and the parameters 
within which it must be exercised. It is important because the role of judgment has 
been so clearly minimized or overlooked by the originalists311 and by most of their 
other critics.312 Thus, while Judge Bork outlines the role of historical research and 
the role of logic, he does little to suggest an active role for judgment. The exercise of 
judgment is inconsistent with Bork’s originalism because he seeks a theory that 
cabins judicial discretion and he views the exercise of judgment as opening the way 
to judicial discretion in a manner that he wants to block.313 As Fried notes, attention 
to the necessary exercise of judgment, and the extent to which it precludes simplistic, 
political reductions, demonstrates the autonomy of constitutional law.314 That proof 
may appear somewhat tentative, for it is always possible for someone to offer an 
account of how the Supreme Court decides cases that make a hash of doctrine. But 
even such theories, howsoever precisely they may account for decisions in the past 
or howsoever accurately they may predict the outcomes in the future, miss the 
critical internal point of view of law. For an element of that internal point of view is 
doctrinal; as Fried notes expressly, judges purport to articulate and apply doctrine in 
their decisions.315 Thus, it is unclear that any such theory, even if it predicted 
outcomes more clearly than any doctrinal statement, could replace doctrine in our 
constitutional practice.  
                                                           
 309 See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58, at 1043-46 (criticizing District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago and praising Loving v. Virginia and Lawrence v. 
Texas not on the basis of the mode of argument each endorse, but upon the wisdom or 
judgment reflected in the decision and in the argument). 
 310 It may be helpful to compare Fried’s account of judgment in constitutional decision-
making with Bobbitt’s notion of conscience. Both appear to be employed to give an account 
of how cases are decided. Both appear to describe an innate human faculty, although 
judgment, for Fried, is clearly informed and sharpened by training. See Charles Fried, The 
Artificial Reason of the Law Or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 38 (1981) (“My 
thesis holds that law is a distinct subject, a branch neither of economics nor of moral 
philosophy . . .; it is that subject which law professors should expound and law students 
study.”); see also BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 48; Fried, Judgment, supra note 58, 
at 1043-46. 
 311 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 45; see also supra text accompanying 
note 295. 
 312 Posner, for example, does not appear to accord judgment a key role in his account, see 
POSNER, SUICIDE PACT, supra note 34, at 17, and Dworkin’s account appears largely to reduce 
judgment to a philosophical exercise of theory construction, see Dworkin, Objectivity, supra 
note 283. 
 313 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 44-45 (describing the alternative to 
originalism as unfettered judicial discretion). 
 314 See FRIED, SAYING, supra note 239, at 241-42. 
 315 See id. 
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Fried’s emphasis upon the place of doctrine in our constitutional law may be 
challenged on two grounds. First, Justice Scalia has challenged directly the notion 
that common-law methods of making legal judgments are appropriate with respect to 
constitutional questions in a democratic constitutional republic.316 Justice Scalia 
argues that such decision-making usurps the power of the democratically elected 
legislature or executive.317 Justice Scalia’s argument of usurpation—a reprise of 
Bickel’s counter-majoritarian difficulty—is that any judicial inquiry beyond what a 
constitutional provision was understood to have meant when adopted arrogates to the 
judicial branch powers reserved to the people and their elected representatives.318 
That argument is admittedly simple, intuitive, and tempting. But Fried may ask what 
alternative there can be to the articulation of doctrine that goes beyond the 
constitutional text and its original understanding. The courts are presented with 
complex and difficult questions, and it is not possible to begin each question anew, 
on the almost blank slate of the constitutional text. Once constitutional doctrine is 
created, as it must, how can it not be authoritative? To strip it of such authority is, as 
Fried emphasizes, to strip the adjudicative function of its constitutive role.319 
The originalists thus face an unhappy choice. They must either deny doctrine 
such a place, and begin the inquiry in each constitutional case, at the beginning, 
armed only with the constitutional text and the question of its original understanding, 
or privilege such doctrine and acknowledge that such precedent as authoritative 
independent of the original understanding of the text. Originalists might respond that 
they do not reduce the role of judges to practicing history. The task of identifying 
relevant precedent and assessing its force is included in the judicial role.320 But most 
originalists view that task as largely adjunct to the fundamental mission of originalist 
interpretation.321 
Second, Fried has no apparent ambition to construct a grand constitutional theory 
of the type criticized by Professors Farber and Sherry.322 Nevertheless, in Fried’s 
emphasis upon the importance of doctrine within our constitutional law,323 it may 
                                                           
 316 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 9-14 (characterizing the common law 
method as a “recipe for usurpation”). 
 317 Id.  
 318 Compare id. (arguing that constitutional questions of interpretation usually have an 
answer as to the original understanding), with ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH (1962) (arguing that the important, hard constitutional questions generally do not 
have clear answers as to the original understanding). 
 319 See Fried, Doctrine, supra note 273, at 1144-51. But Justice Scalia’s response would 
likely be that the alternative is the discovery of the original semantic understanding of the 
constitutional text and the application of that text to the case at hand. There is no room in that 
account for a privileged place for doctrine. 
 320 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 139-40; see also BORK, TEMPTING, 
supra note 5, at 157-58. 
 321 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 139-40. Thus Justice Scalia 
characterizes his account of the force of precedent as a pragmatic exception to his originalist 
theory rather than as an integral part thereof. 
 322 See FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING, supra note 234. 
 323 Fried, Doctrine, supra note 273. 
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appear that he is simply endeavoring to elevate one of Bobbitt’s modalities of 
constitutional argument, the doctrinal, to pride of place.324 That is an unfair reading, 
however, because while Fried’s emphasis is upon doctrine, it is unaccompanied by 
any stronger claim as to the theoretical primacy of that doctrine in constitutional 
argument. His work is intended, as I read it, as a reminder not of the primacy or 
exclusivity of doctrine, but only of its importance.325 If that non-exclusive reading of 
Fried’s claim is correct, then his account is wholly consistent with Bobbitt’s account 
of the independent modalities of constitutional argument.326 
3. Conclusion 
These promising threads in the legal academy point the direction toward the 
reconstruction of our constitutional analysis in the academy, once we are freed of the 
blinders imposed by the debate over originalism. First, and most importantly, these 
works engage on the substance of the constitutional questions and controversies. 
Second, in so doing, they generally do not assume that there is a methodological 
strategy that can provide an answer, or can even provide an argument in support of 
such answer. To the extent that these works do make such methodological 
arguments,327 the better, more charitable reading is to treat those arguments or 
assumptions as only vestiges of the unhappy history of the debate over originalism. 
 In the Introduction I suggested that abandoning the debate about originalism 
would permit the revitalization of constitutional scholarship. The account of our 
constitutional practice that I have defended recognizes the role of theory and 
conceptual analysis in the assessment and development of doctrine, in particular, and 
constitutional argument in general.328 With that role recognized, coupled with the 
recognition that, at least in theory, constitutional scholars in the academy have an 
institutional competitive advantage in their opportunity to give more extended 
consideration to such questions, the constitutional academy ought to be positioned to 
make a more meaningful contribution to our constitutional practice. The failure of 
contemporary constitutional scholarship has not been volume, after all, it has been 
content. But the ultimate success of legal scholarship to resurrect a meaningful role 
will also be subject to the willingness of the Court to recognize the potential 
contribution of scholarship. Only if and when constitutional scholarship returns to a 
focus on substantive constitutional law rather than the methodological claims of the 
debate about originalism will we learn whether that promise can be realized. 
                                                           
 324 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6. But see supra text accompanying notes 281-290. 
 325 Fried’s account of doctrine, after all, leaves room for, and, indeed, requires, the exercise 
of the faculty of judgment in judicial decision. See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58. 
 326 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6, at 7-8, 93-119; see also Fried, Judgment, supra note 
58. 
 327 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 
42 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) [hereinafter Sunstein, CONSTITUTION 2020] 
(defending Sunstein’s arguments for deciding constitutional cases on narrower, less theoretical 
grounds). 
 328 That role also encompasses methods that identify and untangle semantic or conceptual 
confusion. 
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D. The Public Sphere after the End of the Originalism Debate 
The potential for a reconstruction of the Constitution in the public sphere is 
perhaps even more important than the promise of a revitalized constitutional theory 
in the academy. That is because of the relative importance of the two domains in our 
democratic republic. The end of the originalism debate would permit us to revive our 
constitutional discourse within the public sphere of the Republic. The initial inquiry 
into that possibility must explore the proper nature of constitutional discourse in the 
public sphere. I want to confine the focus here on a revivified constitutional 
discourse to questions of constitutional law. I want to exclude, for example, 
important but collateral questions with respect to our talk about the desirable features 
in a Supreme Court nominee, how the nominating process ought to be conducted 
with respect to a nominee’s constitutional jurisprudence, and if and how the 
Constitution ought to be amended.329 The focus here is only on what the Constitution 
says as a matter of law.    
 Two examples suggest how the conversation might unfold in a post-debate 
world in the absence of the constraints of the overhanging debate over originalism 
and its underlying assumptions. The first question is the relationship of the First 
Amendment to the political process and the permissible role of campaign finance 
regulation in federal elections. In Citizens United v. FEC330 the Supreme Court 
struck down certain federal limitations on campaign financing, including limitations 
on corporate contributions.331 But it left intact other important limits.332 The decision 
to invalidate limits on corporate campaign spending has been strongly criticized.333 
That case presented a number of complex substantive and procedural issues. The 
simplest defense of the decision is based upon the straightforward and intuitive 
notion that more speech—particularly more political speech in the public sphere—is 
always better.334 That argument reaches only speech that stands on its own and is not 
intended to drown out other voices, but that concern is not presented in the recent 
campaign finance regulation cases.335 Even the enormously increased level of 
political campaign spending and advertising is not intended to crowd out other 
voices. 
The proponents of campaign finance regulation present both an affirmative case 
for such regulation and attempt to rebut the First Amendment argument that such 
regulation is constitutionally impermissible. For example, Ronald Dworkin, who has 
                                                           
 329 See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD AMEND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2014). 
 330 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 331 Id. at 371. 
 332 See id. 
 333 See President Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010); see also ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the 
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 581 (2011). 
 334 For an account and rebuttal of this argument, see POST, supra note 333, at 62-65, which 
articulates and emphasizes the potentially countervailing principle of maintaining electoral 
integrity. 
 335 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-50. 
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defended freedom of speech against those who would restrict it if and to the extent it 
qualifies as hate speech or pornography,336 has argued that freedom of speech may 
be restricted if such a restriction implements a legitimate distributive goal.337 
Because he subsumes freedom of speech within the general principle of equality, he 
would not interpret the First Amendment with those who are characterized as 
interpreting it as an absolute.338 In the case of campaign advertising and financing, 
those distributional goals or other constitutional principles may be controlling.339   
The regulation of campaign finance and the debate in the public sphere about the 
permissibility of such regulation raises a number of fundamental issues for the 
Republic. My interest here is not in defending a substantive resolution of these 
debates or a theory of free speech insofar as applicable to campaign finance 
regulation. Instead, I want to focus here only on the process, the tone, and the goals 
inherent in such public constitutional discourse and how they would be different 
without the ongoing originalism debate and its underlying foundations. Again, I 
think the originalism debate and its underlying premises have compromised the 
public conversation. The tone is strident and the opposing sides in the debate hardly 
seem to want to persuade one another. That tone has been dominant not just in the 
Justices’ opinions in Citizens United, but also in the discourse in the public square.340 
Some of that indifference arises from the accepted understanding in the 
originalism debate that the divergent objective Constitutions to which each side of 
the debate commits are incommensurable. The protagonists in the debate have 
conceded that they will be unable to convince their opponents in the debate. Even 
when the disagreements are not fundamentally about original understandings, at least 
in any textual or semantic sense,341 the conventions of contemporary constitutional 
argument permit the opposing protagonists to advance arguments that are not 
expected to convince the opposing position. This seems clear in Noel Canning, for 
example, as discussed above. 
The discussion of the requirements of the First Amendment with respect to 
campaign financing has been substantially shaped by the originalism debate and its 
underlying assumptions. That discussion has assumed that there is an answer to the 
question of what the First Amendment requires that may be discovered by 
constitutional research and analysis. Once discovered, alternative conclusions must 
be rejected as false. The commitment to the existence of such an answer arises out of 
the tacit ontological assumptions of originalism. On the anti-originalist side of the 
                                                           
 336 See RONALD DWORKIN, Mackinnon’s Words, in FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 238 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]. 
 337 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL 
DEBATE 69-70 (2006). 
 338 Of course, even those who purportedly interpret the First Amendment as an absolute do 
not do so. See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 236, at 3 (noting that Justice Black’s 
constitutional jurisprudence is more nuanced than has been often thought). 
 339 See POST, supra note 333, at 62-65 (articulating the principle of ensuring electoral 
integrity). 
 340 See, e.g., BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 12, at 132. 
 341 The disagreements might be about expectations and intentions independent of the 
semantic meaning of the constitutional text. 
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debate, defenders of limitations like those struck down in Citizens United make 
prudential and ethical arguments accompanied by half-hearted arguments from 
original understanding.342 Missing is a forthright acknowledgment that the ways in 
which our world has fundamentally changed—technologically, economically, 
socially, and politically—to make appeals to the Founders’ expectations and 
understanding of little help in resolving the question whether campaign finance and 
the role of corporations in political campaign financing may be regulated within the 
limits of the First Amendment. Only with a recognition of the ontological 
commitments—and the error of those commitments—can we hope to have a robust 
constitutional dialogue about campaign finance regulation. The formalism of the 
current debate is sterile and inadequate. 
The second example of constitutional discourse and argument in the public 
sphere that I want to explore relates to the role of the Constitution with respect to 
economic inequality. The problem of inequality as a constitutional issue surfaced 
nearly fifty years ago in the heyday of the Warren Court and the exuberance of the 
liberal legal academy.343 At that time, there were some suggestions that the 
Constitution provided a path toward the mitigation of the extent to which inequality, 
some race-based, some not, infects American society.344 The focus of such strategies 
was on employing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
assure a minimum level of economic resources for all individuals.345 The arguments 
for such economic constitutional rights proved as controversial as any arguments 
made by the Left in the constitutional space.346 The principal objection made to such 
arguments was that they left our constitutional law untethered to text or history and 
without meaningful constraints.347 
More recently, Martha Nussbaum has championed a similar expansive approach 
to the definition of individual constitutional rights.348 Nussbaum describes her 
                                                           
 342 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948-52 (2010). For a more enthusiastic 
appeal to the original understandings with a different interpretation, see Citizens United v. 
FEC, 550 U.S. 310, 388-93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2010). 
 343 See, e.g., Charles Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. 
REV. 3, 19 (1970); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969) (arguing that the Constitution ought to 
be understood as requiring the state to protect against “certain hazards which are endemic in 
an unequal society” rather than required to mitigate inequality itself). 
 344 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 188 (1993); MICHAEL S. HARRINGTON, 
THE OTHER AMERICA 80-81 (1962); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO 
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 828-29 (1944). 
 345 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 343, at 33. 
 346 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, at 207; Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect 
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 362 (1981). 
 347 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 44-45; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, 
at 251-59. 
 348 See Martha Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” 
Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2007) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Capabilities] 
(arguing that an appropriate and important task of a nation’s constitution is to assure its 
citizens the resources and opportunities to develop a core set of capabilities). See generally, 
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approach as identifying the particularly human capabilities that a society ought to 
commit to make available to all of its members.349 Styled a capabilities approach350 
to fundamental rights, Nussbaum argues that such rights ought to be protected as a 
matter of constitutional law.351 While claiming that certain of such rights have been 
well protected in our constitutional law, she acknowledges that others, particularly 
related to social and economic rights, have generally received short shrift.352 One of 
the doctrinal impediments that Nussbaum articulates to a broader recognition of 
rights to other capabilities is formalism.353 She argues that such formalistic reasoning 
may be invoked to disregard the practical realities of human experience that ought, 
ultimately, to be the touchstone of our theory and practice of constitutional rights. In 
particular, she dismisses the cautious invocation of concerns about institutional 
competence to restrain expansive interpretations of constitutional rights.354 
At the outset, it is important to explore the extent to which Nussbaum casts her 
claims as constitutional legal claims rather than as constitutional desiderata. On their 
face, derived from philosophical arguments about persons and justice, they may 
seem to parallel the arguments that Dworkin made decades before355—and be 
similarly vulnerable to challenge from originalists and others.356 While Nussbaum 
recognizes that her project sounds strong themes of constitutional change,357 she 
presents her theoretical arguments, at least in part, as providing legal arguments.358 
Nussbaum’s intent to make legal arguments figures most clearly in her criticisms 
of particular cases decided by the Court in the 2006 Term. Nussbaum is highly 
critical of the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.359 The Court there addressed 
                                                           
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
(2011). 
 349 Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 348, at 6. 
 350 Id. at 7. 
 351 Id. (proposing to employ the capabilities approach as a method for understanding the 
foundations of our constitutional law). 
 352 Id. 
 353 Id. at 96-97. 
 354 Id. 
 355 See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 336; DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 168, at 
225-66.  
 356 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 45 (questioning which philosophy one 
ought to look to if it were to be recognized as a source of constitutional law); Tribe, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 73, at 72; SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 47, at 35-50 
(arguing for the judicial use of incompletely theorized decisions). 
 357 Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 348, at 8-9 (arguing that her “theoretical approach 
has deep ties to the common law tradition of legal reasoning”). Nussbaum also concedes that 
the theory of rights she is defending encompasses rights “not embodied” in the Constitution. 
Id. at 8. 
 358 When Nussbaum turns to stoic concepts of the person her argument is clearly moving 
beyond only authorities of American constitutional law. See id. at 10-11. 
 359 See Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 348, at 84-87 (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124 (2007)). 
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the question of whether a statute prohibiting so-called partial birth abortions was 
permissible under the Constitution.360 In particular, Nussbaum challenges the 
apparent factual predicates on which the Court’s opinion proceeds.361 She argues that 
the Court viewed the relevant facts formalistically and generally failed to 
acknowledge the facts widely accepted as true within the medical community, and 
finds support for her criticisms in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.362 For 
example, she calls out Justice Kennedy’s claim that some women who choose 
abortion come to regret that decision;363 Nussbaum suggests that the available 
empirical evidence shows such women to be the exception rather than the rule.364 
With the English translation, publication, and runaway commercial success of 
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century365 in 2014 and the increasing 
attention being made to the stagnation of wages for the middle class and the 
increasing share of income and wealth earned and held by the most affluent members 
of our society,366 the issue of economic inequality is receiving more attention in the 
public sphere.367 Does that discourse about inequality in the public sphere have a 
constitutional dimension? If so, is that dimension different from the largely orphaned 
analysis defended by Frank Michelman and others in the 1960s?368 More 
importantly, are the arguments today more persuasive than those offered in the past?  
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach would assert that the state has a responsibility 
for providing certain resources to its citizens; that duty is not limited, as Michelman 
argued, to mitigating the hazards of inequality. Nussbaum’s argument has an 
attractive directness that Michelman’s argument lacks, but it also must endorse a 
level of substantive constitutional content that Michelman’s more cautious theory 
avoids. Nussbaum may appear to be codifying and constitutionalizing a particular 
philosophical stance in a substantive manner that many constitutional theorists have 
argued against.369 Nussbaum would probably deny that such normative, 
philosophical premises ought not to inform constitutional analysis rather than deny 
that she has incorporated such premises.370 Unless her philosophical arguments can 
                                                           
 360 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 135-136. 
 361 Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 348, at 86-87. 
 362 Id.  
 363 Id. at 86. 
 364 Id. at 86, n.386. 
 365 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2014).  
 366 See generally GEORGE PACKER, THE UNWINDING: AN INNER HISTORY OF THE NEW 
AMERICA (2014). 
 367 See, e.g., KLEINBARD, supra note 31. 
 368 See supra text accompanying notes 341-42. 
 369 The most celebrated statement of this position is Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner. 
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 14th 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”). For a more recent, 
originalist statement of this position, see SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 45. 
 370 Nussbaum would appear prepared to defend such normative constitutional content. In 
her Foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in its 
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be translated into accepted modes of constitutional arguments her strategy would 
appear questionable as a matter of legal argument. 
E. Reimagining the Contributions of the Principal Protagonists 
Finally, we may re-imagine the analysis of the leading protagonists in the debate 
in a post-debate world. Such a counterfactual analysis is by no means simple. Justice 
Scalia’s traditional riffs on the necessity or righteousness of original understanding 
would be lost, or at least focused on the context of the specific constitutional 
question at hand. Moreover, in a world of competing modes of argument, the 
requirements for an effective argument would have dictated that Justice Scalia’s 
affirmative originalist arguments be accompanied by an express defense as to why 
the alternative modes of arguments ought to be rejected in the case at hand.371 It 
would be necessary to engage on all the modalities of constitutional argument. That 
broader express range of argument would have made Justice Scalia’s arguments and 
opinions more, not less, powerful and persuasive. Moreover, when Justice Scalia’s 
judgment led him away from textual and historical arguments he would have been 
free to do so directly and forthrightly. Will such a post-originalist debate world do 
violence to Justice Scalia’s substantive jurisprudence? Critics on the Left may be 
disappointed; one of the implications is that such broader range of proper and 
permissible argument need not lead Justice Scalia away from his emphasis upon 
historical and textual argument. If Bobbitt be correct that the modalities of 
constitutional argument cannot be reconciled with any algorithm or higher modality 
of argument, then Justice Scalia would be free to continue to concentrate his 
argument in the historical and textual modes. One benefit of such a catholic theory 
and practice of constitutional argument is that Justice Scalia’s snarky dismay at his 
colleagues’ arguments from prudence, structure, precedent, and ethics would be 
forfeit. For the reasons argued above with respect to the tone of the debate over 
originalism,372 would be no small step forward. 
More importantly, however, the result would be more persuasive opinions, 
because by acknowledging and addressing other modes of argument such opinions 
could persuade a broader audience. In other cases recognition of the other modes of 
argument might lead either to the recognition that a different conclusion is 
warranted, or might lead to a different basis on which to defend a result reached on 
an originalist argument. The clearest example may be Bork and Justice Scalia’s use 
of precedent almost as a deus ex machina to rescue them from untenable 
                                                           
2006 Term, Nussbaum assesses those decisions against the normative commitments of the 
capabilities approach. Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 348, at 7. That approach would not 
be important absent a commitment to such normative content. 
 371 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (elaborately 
chronicling the historical practice of religious prayer at public and governmental functions and 
occasions and inferring the meaning of the First Amendment from those practices); Maryland 
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (looking to the eighteenth-
century meaning of “to confront the witnesses against him”). I discuss Maryland v. Craig 
more fully in LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim, supra note 39, at section II.E (exploring some of 
the textual issues that Justice Scalia’s account elides). 
 372 See LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim, supra note 39, at section II.E. 
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implications of their originalist theory.373 The starkest example may be Justice 
Scalia’s confidence that lashing is constitutionally impermissible as cruel and 
unusual punishment.374 
Support for my claim that constitutional practice would be richer and more 
robust in a post-debate world comes from Fried’s suggestion that some of Justice 
Scalia's strongest opinions are those in which he freed himself of the leg irons of 
originalism (paraphrasing a bit).375 Those comments suggest the directions that 
would have become available to Justice Scalia to revivify his constitutional analysis 
and to reconnect it with the public discourse we so desperately need. Justice Scalia 
might have been able to make a persuasive case that confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment requires that accused see the witness against him, not merely that the 
witness be identified and available for cross-examination without relying only upon 
eighteenth-century practice, for example. 
Dworkin’s constitutional analysis and argument could also be stronger in such a 
world. Dworkin’s claim to special, philosophical expertise in constitutional analysis 
would be denied in such a world, and stripped of such Herculean talents, Dworkin 
might choose to confine himself to articulating the unities of value theory,376 rather 
than the requirements of constitutional law. Not only must that claim be rejected, but 
Dworkin’s more general claim to incorporate moral theory into constitutional cases 
must also be rejected.377 Indeed, Dworkin has himself occasionally distinguished his 
jurisprudential analysis from his legal analysis, despite his jurisprudential theory of 
law as integrity.378 Before he was a jurisprude, Dworkin was a fine lawyer. 
An example of Dworkin’s constitutional analysis that stands on its own may be 
his analysis of the requirement of constitutional equal treatment. Dworkin argues 
that mere treatment equally is insufficient and instead treatment must be of persons 
                                                           
 373 The prohibition on segregated public schools in Brown and the decisions limiting or 
prohibiting lashing would appear to stand as examples of such use. See Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, 
Originalism]; see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, at 157-59. It is hard to imagine that any 
originalism—or other constitutional theory—that would reverse Brown or permit lashing as a 
criminal punishment would be a plausible or attractive account of our Constitution. But see 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 139-40. The power of our substantive 
commitments to certain constitutional outcomes in the face of potentially inconsistent 
constitutional theory bears analysis and may help confirm the jurisprudential claims I have 
made elsewhere, but I cannot explore that line of analysis here. 
 374 See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 373, at 861 (making a modest defense of 
originalism largely without the more sweeping claims Justice Scalia has come to defend). 
 375 See Fried, Judgment, supra note 58, at 1043-46. 
 376 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011) (arguing for a unified 
theory of objective value). 
 377 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Should Constitutional Judges 
Be Philosophers?, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 5 
(Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006) (arguing that a purely philosophical approach, which incorporates 
moral philosophy into the core of constitutional interpretation, to the exclusion of historical 
argument, does not adequately support Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity). 
 378 See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 168, at 225-66. 
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as equals379 might be an example of a subtle and perhaps compelling distinction that 
warrants careful consideration as a reading of the constitutional text. Nevertheless, 
much of his work has been at a level of abstraction and theory that appears 
inconsistent with the kind of analysis that we are urging in the next generation of 
constitutional thinking. In the post-originalism debate world would Dworkin be 
entitled to his commitment to a theory of law as integrity in his constitutional 
interpretation? To the extent that law as integrity is grounded on a foundational, 
representational theory, Dworkin’s philosophical theory need be modified or 
abandoned. But the task of articulating constitutional doctrine or defending the 
constitutional decisions that Dworkin endorses need not be abandoned. His 
substantive constitutional theory may well remain intact. 
To the extent that Dworkin's distinctive strategy in constitutional interpretation is 
to make express reference to moral theory,380 the question arises whether that 
strategy can be reconciled with Bobbitt's acknowledgment of the importance of 
ethical argument.381 Bobbitt, of course, distinguishes his concept of ethical argument 
from moral argument.382 Thus, to the extent that Bobbitt's account would exclude 
arguments from moral theory, just as it would exclude classically political 
arguments,383 Dworkin's interpretation would apparently need radical reconstruction. 
If Dworkin abandons his philosophical defense of his claims about equality and 
autonomy384 as a matter of constitutional argument, what is left? He would no longer 
be able to sneer at the originalists as philosophical naïfs.385 That canard does not 
have the force that Dworkin imagines.386 Dworkin would no longer be able to reach 
outside the law to philosophy to claim support or justification for the constitutional 
decisions he wants to endorse.387 That said, theory is important in constitutional 
interpretation and adjudication and Dworkin is as able as any to tease out the 
                                                           
 379 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 377, at 227. 
 380 See Rebecca L. Brown, How Constitutional Theory Found its Soul: The Contribution of 
Ronald Dworkin, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 5 
(Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006). 
 381 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6, at 94. 
 382 Id. at 94-95. 
 383 See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1240 (1989) (review essay 
about MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW) (defending the claim that constitutional law has a particular domain and cannot simply 
be reduced to a matter of political choice or power). 
 384 See generally DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 336; DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra 
note 168 (arguing that legal positivism must be rejected because legal interpretation, including 
constitutional interpretation, requires appeal to, and the harmonization with, moral principles); 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 377 (arguing that judicial decision requires 
the application of principles, rather than simply the application of legal rules or the weighing 
of competing interests like a legislative decision make, although Dworkin may later have 
moved away from this dichotomy). 
 385 See Dworkin, INTERPRETATION, supra note 73, at 117 n.6. 
 386 See generally LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 39 
(arguing that philosophy cannot provide answers to constitutional controversies). 
 387 See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 168, at 97-98. 
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implications of theory. But to play as a constitutional interpreter he must descend 
from the Mt. Olympus of philosophy and abandon his claim that his philosophical 
sophistication and his associated philosophical premises ground his constitutional 
analysis and conclusions more firmly than, for example, the originalists. But 
Dworkin’s doctrinal and ethical arguments can still be made forcefully in such brave 
new world. 
Recasting Dworkin’s central arguments in the post-debate, anti-foundational, 
multi-modal world of constitutional practice that I have described here requires one 
of two strategies. First, Dworkin might challenge Bobbitt’s rejection of natural law 
arguments as a permissible mode of constitutional argument.388 Dworkin might 
defend such a mode of argument as a continuing part of our accepted constitutional 
practice. The role that such argument played historically certainly creates a 
foundation for such an argument.389 But since Lochner390 was discredited, it is 
certainly not clear that natural law argument has been accepted in our constitutional 
practice. Second, Dworkin might recast his expressly moral arguments as ethical 
arguments, in Bobbitt’s sense. Both strategies are possible and would appear to offer 
the promise of making Dworkin’s arguments more legal—and more persuasive. 
Sunstein’s constitutional argument could be stronger in such a world, too. If 
Sunstein abandoned his methodological claim that judicial decisions ought to be 
minimalist and the appeal to principle muted or rejected, he could acknowledge the 
place of ethical argument and other, principled claims that has been central, if rare, 
in our constitutional jurisprudence.391 From that stance he would be more likely to 
give Brown its due and to recognize the force of Heller, for example. 
Finally, as noted above, Laurence Tribe has announced392 that he can no longer 
produce his celebrated constitutional law treatise.393 The reason is the disarray in the 
articulation of constitutional law in the current Supreme Court.394 That reservation 
has not prevented him from continuing to otherwise engage actively in our 
constitutional discourse and argument.395 But Tribe's claim is inconsistent with his 
occasional recognition that our constitutional law is not simply a matter of 
identifying, following, or conforming to rules.396 The tension and the sometimes 
                                                           
 388 See Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1916 
(1994) (arguing that such natural law arguments do not figure frequently or prominently in 
contemporary arguments in constitutional adjudication).  
 389 See generally Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American 
Constitutional Law (pts. 1 & 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1929). 
 390 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 391 See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 6, at 125-36. 
 392 Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 292, 294-95. 
 393 TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 222. 
 394 Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 292-293. See generally TRIBE & MATZ, 
UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60. 
 395 See, e.g., TRIBE & MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 60; TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra 
note 13. 
 396 Tribe’s plaintive cry about the disarray in our constitutional doctrine is one of the 
important reasons that I have elsewhere characterized Tribe as rejecting the anti-
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inconsistency in our contemporary constitutional doctrine and decisions is indicative 
of the competing arguments that are made or which implicitly underlie that doctrine 
and decision. Tribe may be tacitly drawing on ontological assumptions about the 
nature of the Constitution that would characterize the Constitution as ontologically 
independent of us.397 Tribe seems to be asserting that the noumenal Constitution has 
become obscured and difficult, if not impossible, to articulate. Absent such an 
erroneous ontological assumption it is unclear why an exegetical treatise is 
impossible or devalued. Tribe’s treatise is at least as important in a world freed of 
the shackles of the originalism debate and its underlying foundations. The value of 
that treatise does not arise from its correct representation of the objective 
Constitution. 
II. OUR AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
Four conclusions should be drawn expressly from this final step in the 
therapeutic project. First, there is a plausible important alternative constitutional 
mission for the courts, the legal academy, and the public if we abandon the debate 
over originalism. Prior articles outlined the contradictions inherent in the debate and 
the implausibility of the unstated premises on which it was based.398 This Article has 
shown how promising our constitutional culture could be if we abandoned that 
fruitless debate. Without the constraints of keeping score within the overhanging 
debate about originalism and without the temptation of global, methodological 
strategies to delegitimize the arguments and approaches of the opposing positions, 
protagonists on both sides of the debate can engage substantively about the 
constitutional questions the Republic and its citizens face. We can articulate and 
debate the constitutional controversies we face recognizing that in the end the Court 
(and the other, less authoritative constitutional actors) can and must decide those 
questions on the basis of the array of constitutional arguments that comprise our 
constitutional decision process. Readers must judge for themselves whether such a 
constitutional culture and self-conscious practice promises to be more engaging than 
the practice we have now that is overshadowed by the acrimonious, scholastic, and 
seemingly never-ending debate over originalism. 
Second, a post-debate culture accords a more robust place for the public in our 
constitutional discourse. Constitutional decision is not a matter only for the experts 
in arcane legal history of the eighteenth century or the artificial and nuanced puzzles 
of contemporary analytic philosophy, or for those who have mastered the intricacies 
of two centuries of constitutional doctrine—although some of those participants in 
our constitutional discourse have an important role to play. The citizenry has a 
central place in our constitutional discourse and decision-making, and not only in 
moments of constitutional crisis.399 Their role is to understand what the Constitution 
                                                           
representational, anti-foundational account that I have endorsed. See LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 1. 
 397 See generally id. 
 398 See id.; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 3; LeDuc, Philosophy and 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 39. 
 399 But see generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993) 
(defending a theory of constitutional change in which de facto amendments to the Constitution 
may be adopted at moments of constitutional crisis by the will of the people outside the 
purportedly exclusive processes provided for by Article V). 
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provides and, at some level, to act in compliance with it. That understanding—and 
the argument about matters of constitutional controversy—cannot and should not be 
disassociated from the substantive normative questions at the heart of many such 
disputes. At the same time, that argument cannot be reduced to an argument about 
such normative questions; the historical understanding and the semantic and 
pragmatic import of the constitutional text are both relevant and potentially 
determinative with respect to contemporary constitutional questions. The 
requirements imposed by the Constitution figure in our political debate and 
discourse in the public sphere—although not all such discourse and debate 
implicates constitutional issues. For example, in the 2012 presidential elections and, 
in all likelihood, in the 2016 election cycle the United States policy on immigration 
has figured prominently in the campaign debate. Contemporaneously, a number of 
recent state laws have been struck down, in whole or in part, for constitutional 
infirmities.400 The constitutional constraints on United States immigration policy can 
be and ought to be a part of that conversation and debate. The policy debate ought to 
be informed by the constitutional parameters and the policy debate, including the 
prudential concerns that shape that debate, ought also to inform the resolution of the 
constitutional questions that are a part of that debate. 
Third, it is important to note the limits on what I have argued here. In defending 
the benefits of renewed attention to doctrine, I do not mean to deny Sunstein’s claim 
that we must acknowledge the limits of constitutional law as an element of our 
political society. We must recognize and acknowledge the primacy of democratic 
politics.401 But Sunstein’s jurisprudential claims for privileging minimal, 
incompletely theorized constitutional decisions and opinions is largely irrelevant to 
the constitutional questions I have been addressing. Even if we acknowledge the 
primacy of democratic politics in the executive and legislative branches of the 
federal government, there will always be judicial constitutional questions for the 
Court. Those questions will likely arise from a variety of sources. Some will arise 
from working out the implications of fundamental principles. Some will arise from 
the evolution of our political society and new ways in which government does or 
does not seek to meet the needs of its citizens. Some will arise from technological 
and other changes in the world. Some will likely arise as particular doctrines or 
precedents of our constitutional law appear increasingly unsatisfactory or 
wrongheaded. 
Those constitutional questions presented to the courts will be different, and the 
methods of adjudication different, from the problems properly presented to the 
legislative and executive branches. Dworkin was right to emphasize the difference 
between the modes of argument deployed in legislation and adjudication, even if he 
erred in his description of the arguments available in constitutional adjudication.402 
The legislative and the executive branch, after all, are engaging in governing; they 
are seeking to accomplish various goals, within the framework of the Constitution—
                                                           
 400 See, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 2046 (2015) (invalidating a state law denying bail to alleged illegal immigrants under 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 401 Sunstein, CONSTITUTION 2020, supra note 327, at 37. 
 402 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 377, at 82-84. 
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or, potentially, without regard for the Constitution.403 The judiciary is charged only 
with adjudicating the controversies brought by a party with standing that come 
before it. As a result, it is not just as Dworkin notes that judges cannot consider 
certain policy questions (or, at least need give such arguments less weight than the 
legislature would, for example) but that the judiciary must weigh principles of the 
Constitution (or provisions thereof) more heavily.404 
It will remain judges’ task to make the arguments and judgments necessary to 
articulate our constitutional doctrine and decide our constitutional cases. That may 
be done sometimes, but not always, on a minimalist basis, but it need not be done on 
a minimalist basis.405 As Bork suggests, Griswold could perhaps have been decided 
with the same result on the basis that the Connecticut criminal statute struck down 
was no longer valid and enforceable under the Equal Protection Clause because that 
law had fallen into desuetude.406 That would have been a far more minimalist, and 
less controversial approach. It would also, of course, have been a very different 
decision. In light of the place of Griswold and its progeny in our constitutional 
jurisprudence, it is not clear that such a more limited rationale for the decision would 
have been more desirable. 
Brown, for example, required a fundamental, principled shift in the constitutional 
theory and practice of the Equal Protection Clause if it were to have the effect the 
Court intended, just as almost a century before, Justice Taney and the Court 
concluded in Dred Scott that the interpretation and practice of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause required such a fundamental interpretation.407 Brown could not 
have been effectively decided as an entirely minimalist decision.408 There was an 
                                                           
 403 While the President and members of Congress all swear an oath to uphold the 
Constitution—and, in the case of President Obama on his inauguration in 2009, more than 
one—and many are attentive to constitutional directives, there are occasionally circumstances 
in which the cost of constitutional compliance may appear too high and the Congress or the 
President is prepared to ignore or test the constitutional limits on action. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, 
THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT (2012) (describing the re-
administration of the President’s oath of office in 2009); see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (holding that no constitutional authority existed for 
the President, acting as Commander in Chief, to take control of the privately-owned steel mills 
located in the United States). 
 404 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 377, at 82-84. 
 405 The potentially minimalist decision in Heller (at least in Sunstein’s view) might have 
been decided (perhaps more forthrightly, if more controversially) in a less minimal way. 
 406 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 5, at 96. The doctrine of desuetude, while perhaps not yet 
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have been novel, if conceptually more limited. The doctrine of desuetude has, however, 
historically been very narrowly applied. 
 407 It is not clear that Sunstein acknowledges the need ever for broader decisions–or that 
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within a political community on fundamental values, each commanding substantial support, it 
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in all circumstances there cannot be a winner entitled to a decision in its favor or that a court 
would not owe a decision in favor of such a party’s position. 
 408 Even as it was decided, Brown was incompletely theorized in certain respects. Brown 
did not expressly articulate the principle that segregated facilities or racial discrimination was 
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important advance in our constitutional law when the Court subsequently moved 
from its desperate prudential reasoning in Naim409 to avoid confronting state anti-
miscegenation laws to that reading of the Equal Protection Clause that the Court 
forthrightly pronounced in Loving410 in striking down such laws. The decision in 
Loving was important, not simply because of its outcome, as the first case striking 
down a southern anti-miscegenation law, but for its holding and reasoning about the 
scope of the Equal Protection Clause. Sunstein perhaps underestimates both the hard 
work of constitutional law that remains to be done,411 and the importance of that 
work,412 within our existing adjudicative and argumentative practices. The work is 
important because, among other reasons, the always careful and sometimes creative 
analysis of constitutional doctrine is the means by which we constitute the corpus of 
our most fundamental law. That law shapes the lives of our citizens and the course of 
our political society and culture. 
                                                           
inherently inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the particular psychological 
harm identified as resulting from racially segregated public schools provided a narrower 
ground of decision than a broader, more fully principled rationale would have provided. The 
broader, more principled reading that we now find in Brown is in part shaped by the broader 
force that decision has acquired over time. 
 409 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam). I characterize this reasoning as 
desperately prudential because the Court repeatedly refused to consider the manifest 
constitutional question presented, affirming the state’s denial of the petitioner’s rights, on the 
purported basis of inadequate pleadings that the state refused to permit to be redressed. See 
Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (final state judicial action, denying the petitioner the 
ability to reopen the record in the trial court). The plaintiff in Naim was denied review in the 
Supreme Court on procedural grounds. See Naim, 350 U.S. at 355. Subsequent historical 
research has demonstrated that the Court’s refusal to hear the case was driven by prudential 
concerns forcefully argued by Justice Frankfurter. See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, 
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L. 
REV. 1 (1979) (referring to correspondence among the Justices, principally a memorandum 
authored by Justice Frankfurter, to describe how Justice Frankfurter’s prudential arguments 
led the Court to decline to address state prohibitions on interracial marriage for many years 
after Brown was decided). 
 410 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finally, thirteen years after Brown, striking down Virginia’s 
prohibition on interracial marriage). For an important acknowledgment of the importance of 
Loving see Fried, Judgment, supra note 58, at 1044 (characterizing Brown as vulnerable until 
the reasoning of Loving was articulated). Indeed, after Brown was decided, some 
constitutional theorists denied that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to 
prohibit state anti-miscegenation statutes. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original 
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment would not reach state anti-miscegenation statutes). 
 411 See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE, supra note 165; SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 47, 
at 38-41 (suggesting that a minimalism permits constitutional decisions to be made and 
accepted on a narrow basis without the need for consideration of the implications of broader 
principles). 
 412 To the extent that the Supreme Court adopts a minimalist approach and foregoes the 
statement of broader principle, it forfeits the opportunity of expressive leadership; Sunstein 
would perhaps argue that in our democratic republic that role is better played by our 
democratically elected representatives. 
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Fourth, and finally, Professor Tribe’s plaintive cry413 ought not to be, and cannot 
be, ignored. But Tribe's new reservations about the theoretical or doctrinal coherence 
of constitutional doctrine, like the limited aspirations of Sunstein’s theoretical 
minimalism, are misplaced. There cannot be a definitive or controlling conceptual 
synthesis of a law whose very legitimacy is simply a matter of making and choosing 
among various forms of argument in a practice that is discrete but hardly 
independent of the political society within which it unfolds. The goal of 
constitutional interpretation and criticism is not simply, nor even primarily, the 
construction of grand theory and comprehensive paradigms. Outcomes and theory, at 
the retail level of doctrine, are important because there is no alternative. The 
articulation of doctrine, and the exploration of the ways in which the different types 
of constitutional argument bear on questions like those surrounding the current 
constitutional issues of national security and federalism, for example, present a 
complex task for the courts and for the legal academy. That task requires attention to 
doctrine and to the practice of constitutional argument, not to philosophical theory. It 
requires practical reasoning and it requires, above all, judgment. The time for 
ontological or other philosophical distractions—whether express or only implied—




                                                           
 413 Tribe, Treatise Power, supra note 218, at 292. 
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